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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL
BIAS IN POLICE STOPS
Rohit Asirvatham & Michael D. Frakes
ABSTRACT—This Article empirically tests the conventional wisdom that a
permissive constitutional standard bearing on pretextual traffic stops—such
as the one announced by the Supreme Court in Whren v. United States—
contributes to racial disparities in traffic stops. To gain empirical traction on
this question, we look to state constitutional law. In particular, we consider
a natural experiment afforded by changes in the State of Washington’s rules
regarding traffic stops. Following Whren, the Washington Supreme Court
first took a more restrictive stance than the U.S. Supreme Court, prohibiting
pretextual stops by police officers, but later reversed course and instituted a
laxer standard, effectively equivalent to Whren’s.
We investigate the effect of this retreat to a Whren-like standard on the
degree of racial disparities in traffic stops in Washington. For that purpose,
we use a dataset of over 7 million traffic stops and employ a range of
empirical techniques—including the estimation of difference-in-difference
and triple-differences specifications—that are designed to isolate the effect
of the change in Washington constitutional law and account for both
observable and unobservable factors that may also impact racial disparities
in traffic-stop rates. In particular, we employ a novel methodological
approach designed to separate the effect of the change in constitutional
standards in Washington from the effect of Washington’s contemporaneous
legalization of recreational marijuana.
Across our deep dive into these matters, we fail to find evidence that
supports the conventional wisdom that a Whren-like standard intensifies
racial bias in officers’ decisions to initiate stops. On the contrary, our results
suggest that constitutional standards, at best, have little to no impact on the
gap between the stop rates of non-white and white drivers (or between Black
and white drivers).
Racial disparities in traffic stops are an undeniable problem. And to best
address this problem, we need to understand which legal tools do and do not
work in regulating officer behavior. We suggest our findings may be due to
certain inherent weaknesses in the way in which the relevant constitutional
standards are enforced—i.e., via the exclusionary rule. To the extent an
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officer’s decision to initiate a traffic stop is heavily driven by factors other
than the remote possibility that any evidence obtained during a pretextual
stop will be suppressed, it is unlikely that a constitutional-rights-based
approach will meaningfully reduce racial disparities in traffic-stop rates.
Instead, we propose several extraconstitutional approaches to this critical
problem, including the use of administrative disciplinary systems that
evaluate an officer’s aggregate pattern of behavior, not their behavior in
individual cases—i.e., approaches designed to bolster a deterrent channel—
along with the development of technologies that rely less on officer
discretion in the first place.
AUTHORS—Rohit Asirvatham is a law clerk to Judge David R. Stras, United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Michael Frakes is the A.
Kenneth Pye Professor of Law and Professor of Economics at Duke
University and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic
Research. We are grateful for helpful comments from Thomas Frampton,
Brandon Garrett, Benjamin Grunwald, Janet Moore, Kyle Rozema,
Christopher Slobogin, Megan Stevenson and seminar participants at the
UVA Law and Economics Colloquium and the Duke Center for Science and
Justice Workshop. All views expressed in this Article are our own and do
not reflect the views of Judge Stras, the Eighth Circuit, or the federal
judiciary.
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INTRODUCTION
By July 6, 2016, getting pulled over was routine for Philando Castile.
The Black thirty-two-year-old school cafeteria worker had already been
stopped at least fifty-two times in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area for reasons
including not wearing a seat belt, speeding,1 and driving at night with an unlit
license plate.2 This time, the officer told Castile he was being pulled over for
driving with a broken taillight.3 But perhaps that was not entirely true. Before
1 Carla K. Johnson & Steve Karnowski, Stopped 52 Times by Police: Was It Racial Profiling?,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 9, 2016), https://apnews.com/article/81351f97c0be4caea5c91b5662848129
[https://perma.cc/B2AW-XT3Q].
2 Sharon LaFraniere & Mitch Smith, Philando Castile Was Pulled Over 49 Times in 13 Years, Often
for Minor Infractions, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/beforephilando-castiles-fatal-encounter-a-costly-trail-of-minor-traffic-stops.html
[https://perma.cc/8G8672U8].
3 Mitch Smith, Video of Police Killing of Philando Castile Is Publicly Released, N.Y. TIMES (June
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/police-shooting-castile-trial-video.html [https://
perma.cc/AGT8-YSC2].
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stopping him, Officer Yanez had radioed a colleague that Castile fit the
description of a robbery suspect, citing Castile’s “wide-set nose.” 4
Nonetheless, when Officer Yanez walked up to Castile’s car, he said, “the
reason I pulled you over [is] your brake lights are out.” 5 Minutes later,
Philando Castile was dead, shot by Officer Yanez.6
In his final minutes, Walter Scott, a fifty-year-old Black man, heard
something similar to what Castile had: “The reason for the stop is your brake
light is out.”7 Sam DuBose heard: “You don’t have a front license plate on
your car.”8 Sandra Bland heard: “You failed to signal your lane change.”9
Traffic stops open the door to violence. 10 They are one of the most
common entry points for contact between civilians and the police.11 And the
harms that can accompany a traffic stop encompass far more than physical
violence. When an individual is stopped, her day is put on hold by the
officer’s authority as an arm of the state.12 When the officer walks up and
looks inside the car’s window, her privacy is invaded. Even the most routine
stop can cause apprehension or fear, for some.13 And a resulting ticket or fine
can have devastating effects on the driver. For example, drivers who cannot
afford to pay the fine often lose their licenses.14 As a result, those who need
4

Id.
CBS News, Police Dashcam Video Released in Fatal Shooting of Philando Castile, YOUTUBE
(June 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Y7sgZZQ7pw [https://perma.cc/M95B-4LHC].
6 Id.; German Lopez, Philando Castile Minnesota Police Shooting: Officer Cleared of Manslaughter
Charge, VOX (June 16, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.vox.com/2016/7/7/12116288/minnesota-policeshooting-philando-castile-falcon-heights-video [https://perma.cc/7XK9-RYY7].
7 CNN, Dash Cam Shows Moments Before Shooting of Walter Scott, YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYaYdaFFLoQ [https://perma.cc/U58X-GF4Q]; Michael S.
Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murderin-black-mans-death.html [https://perma.cc/RWV5-Z992].
8 WCPO 9, Full Video: Police Officer Ray Tensing Shoots Sam DuBose During Traffic Stop,
YOUTUBE (July 29, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYINt6uNjA0 [https://perma.cc/GXJ5KFCC].
9 Wall Street Journal, Sandra Bland Arrest Footage, YOUTUBE (July 22, 2015), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=y9t1N2wRvjc [https://perma.cc/Y69B-9AMG].
10 See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 130 (2017).
11 ERIKA HARRELL & ELIZABETH DAVIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 255730, CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2018 – STATISTICAL TABLES 4 tbl.2 (2020), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cbpp18st.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2MG-VH96].
12
David A. Harris, Racial Profiling, in 2 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POLICING 117, 135 (Erik
Luna ed., 2017).
13 Id. at 136.
14 See ALEX BENDER, STEPHAN BINGHAM, MARI CASTALDI, ELISA DELLA PIANA, MEREDITH
DESAUTELS, MICHAEL HERALD, ENDRIA RICHARDSON, JESSE STOUT & THERESA ZHEN, NOT JUST A
5
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a license to work will lose their jobs.15 And that in turn makes it harder for
them to pay their fines and have their licenses reinstated.16 The stakes for
ensuring evenhanded traffic enforcement are high. But traffic enforcement
is not evenhanded.17 The evidence is clear: Black drivers are more likely to
be stopped than white drivers, even when accounting for the benchmarking
problem.18
A critical question is how to reduce this racial bias. We must figure out
which avenues of attack are likely to be fruitful and which are likely to fail.
A dominant view in the literature is that a robust Fourth Amendment right
against pretextual stops is one such promising avenue. Our overarching goal
in this Article is to assess the merits of this conventional wisdom. Ultimately,
our analysis demonstrates that this dominant view—while understandable at
first blush—simply lacks empirical support.
To be sure, figuring out how to regulate traffic stops presents a knotty
puzzle. Given the sheer number of traffic rules, most people commit some
sort of technical violation almost every time they drive. Most would agree it
is not a good idea to stop people for literally every traffic violation. That
would be incredibly costly, without a sufficient corresponding marginal
increase in safety. But most would also agree that it is dangerous to give
drivers carte blanche to violate traffic laws. That too would be costly—in
FERGUSON PROBLEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2015), https://
www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality
-in-California-4.8.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BV3-6HJU].
15 Id. at 6–7 (“Data shows that a valid driver’s license is a more accurate predictor of sustained
employment than a General Educational Development (GED) diploma. . . . A New Jersey study found
that 42% of people whose driver’s licenses were suspended lost their jobs as a result of the suspension.”).
16 Id. at 6.
17 See Harris, supra note 12, at 141 (“[W]e see in study after study on traffic stops and stop-andfrisks: Police stop African-Americans and Latinos more often than whites, even though stops of whites
yield contraband or arrests or summonses more often.”); Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor,
Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty,
Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops
Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 740–41 (2020).
18 Pierson et al., supra note 17, at 736–37. The benchmarking problem is a common criticism raised
against studies that purport to show racial bias. Cf. id. at 737 (recognizing the benchmarking problem).
In this context, the benchmarking problem is that because one cannot easily measure the racial distribution
of those who actually violated traffic laws, but instead only those who are stopped, it is often difficult to
know whether disproportionate stops are actually caused by disproportionate traffic-code violations.
Pierson et al. work around this benchmarking problem by using a “veil-of-darkness” methodology in
which they observe that stops that take place at the same time and same place are less racially
disproportionate on those dates when that time is after sunset—when it is dark—than before. Id. at 736.
Scholars have also demonstrated that the racial bias exhibited in traffic stops extends beyond just bias in
the initiation of that stop. Once stopped, Black and Hispanic drivers are searched based on a lower
standard of evidence than white drivers. Id. Pierson et al. infer this based on the rate and success of
searches. Id. Though racial bias in both dimensions is critically important, our analysis will focus on the
origins of these encounters—i.e., on racial bias in the officers’ initial decision to stop a driver.
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terms of safety. So the dilemma is that while we do want officers to stop
some people who violate a traffic law, we do not want an officer’s decision
about whether to stop a given driver to be based on bad reasons. Two such
bad reasons are (1) an unsubstantiated hunch of criminal activity and
(2) race. Allowing for either of these reasons to serve as the basis for a stop
could increase the likelihood of racial bias in stops because a hunch might
be influenced by the suspect’s race. Thus, the puzzle is how to protect drivers
from being stopped on those bad grounds when, because everyone commits
traffic violations, those bad grounds will almost always appear alongside a
permissible reason for a stop. 19 How do we know whether a driver was
stopped because he was Black or because he was driving 7 miles per hour
over the speed limit?
The Supreme Court could have said that pretextual stops—stops in
which there was a traffic violation but an impermissible reason was the real
motivation behind the stop—violate the Fourth Amendment. Instead, in
Whren v. United States, the Court held that as long as there is a traffic
violation, the stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the
officer’s real motivations. 20 Understandably, the decision was met with a
flood of scholarly criticism taking the position that, by failing to provide a
Fourth Amendment right against pretextual stops, the Court exacerbated the
problem of racial bias in traffic stops.21 And many argue that, given the scope

19 See Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2001, 2006 (1998).
20 517 U.S. 806, 808, 813, 819 (1996).
21 See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, Kelsey Shoub & Bayard Love, Targeting Young
Men of Color for Search and Arrest During Traffic Stops: Evidence from North Carolina, 2002–2013,
5 POL., GRPS., & IDENTITIES 107, 108 (2017) (“The Whren decision opened the floodgates to pretextual
stops. Thus, tens of thousands of black and brown drivers have routinely been stopped and searched in
an effort to reduce drug use.”); Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882, 941
(2015) (“Whren is in many ways the Plessy of its era. It endorsed racial discrimination, and thereby
encouraged its spread.”); Harris, supra note 12, at 127, 135 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has constructed
a perfect legal regime to allow police to use traffic stops as such pretexts.”); Tracey Maclin, Cops and
Cars: How the Automobile Drove Fourth Amendment Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2317, 2347–49 (2019)
(suggesting that Whren “presented the Court the opportunity to address” the problem of pretextual stops);
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the
Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 671–72 (2002); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, An Empirical
Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling, 73 STAN. L. REV. 637, 664 (2021) (“In the wake of
Whren, scholars expressed widespread concern that by green-lighting pretextual traffic stops, the
Supreme Court had inadvertently facilitated racial profiling.”); Carbado, supra note 10, at 151–56
(describing how traffic stops can “function as gateways to more intrusive searches and seizures”);
Christopher Kutz, Op-Ed: For a Safer America, Curtail Traffic Stops, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015,
5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0813-kutz-traffic-stops-20150812-story.html
[https://perma.cc/KVL9-D477] (“[T]he effect of Whren is that police are almost completely shielded from
legal review of their decision to stop a driver.”).
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that officers have to exhibit racial bias when permitted to conduct pretextual
stops, a Fourth Amendment rule against pretextual stops would work to
reduce that racial bias.22
Nonetheless, there may be reasons to doubt this widely held view—that
is, reasons to doubt whether constitutional prohibitions of pretextual stops
would actually reduce racial disparities in traffic-stop rates in practice. First,
we suggest that the means of enforcing these constitutional protections—i.e.,
the exclusionary rule—may insufficiently deter officers in the first place.
After all, to the extent an officer’s decision to initiate a traffic stop is heavily
driven by factors other than the remote possibility that any evidence obtained
during a pretextual stop will be suppressed, it is unlikely that a constitutionalrights-based approach will meaningfully reduce racial disparities in trafficstop rates. Second, and relatedly, the evidentiary barriers inherent in proving
pretext may fundamentally limit the degree to which a stricter standard
would impact case outcomes and thus regulate officer behavior.
Altogether, despite the near consensus in the literature for addressing
racial disparities in traffic-stop rates through a constitutional-rights-based
approach, the theoretical case for that approach is simply ambiguous. Given
this ambiguity, this inquiry comes down to an empirical exercise. And it is
this exercise that is at the heart of our Article. We ask the question: Would a
Fourth Amendment right against pretextual stops reduce racial disparities in
the initiation of traffic stops? Our data suggest: no.
Until recently, empirically assessing this question was very difficult. At
the time of the Whren decision, we lacked good data on police stops. And
even as data improved, having only post-Whren data did not tell us much
because there was nothing to which to compare it. Two Washington Supreme
Court decisions changed that. Disagreeing with Whren, the Washington
Supreme Court first interpreted its state constitution’s Fourth Amendment
analogue as prohibiting pretextual traffic stops.23 But thirteen years later, in
2012, it changed course and lowered that standard, sanctioning previously
prohibited stops.24 As a result, we have a natural experiment through which
to analyze the effect of a decision like Whren on racial bias in traffic stops.
We analyze data from over 7 million traffic stops in Washington (along
with nearly 2.5 million traffic stops in Colorado in our control analyses) and
explore how racial disparities in those stops evolved in the period around the
22 Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the “Would Have” Test Work?,
57 DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 930–31 (2008) (“[M]any legal scholars have argued that use of a ‘reasonable
officer’ test, also known as the ‘would have’ test, would combat the tendency to use traffic infractions as
a pretext . . . and would consequently protect drivers.”).
23 State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
24 State v. Arreola, 290 P.3d 983, 991 (Wash. 2012).
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2012 change in constitutional law in Washington. Our analysis employs a
number of empirical techniques to distinguish the effect of this change in the
law from a range of both observable and unobservable factors that may
likewise impact racial disparities in the rate of traffic stops. One particular
challenge of this nature is posed by the fact that the change in the
constitutional treatment of pretextual stops in the State of Washington that
forms the basis for this natural experiment coincided to the month with
Washington’s legalization of recreational marijuana. To confront this
challenge, we employ a novel approach that takes advantage of the fact that
Colorado likewise legalized recreational marijuana within days of
Washington but did not alter its Fourth Amendment-like treatment of
pretextual stops. These facts allow us to incorporate a comparison of
Colorado and Washington to untangle the effects of the two coinciding
changes.
Taking a broad array of approaches, our analysis ultimately finds no
robust evidence that the legal change in Washington had an effect on racial
disparities in traffic stops. If anything, our findings suggest that Washington
experienced a trend towards greater and greater racial disparities in traffic
stops that predated the relevant change in constitutional rights, with the 2012
Washington Supreme Court decision that lowered the constitutional standard
for pretextual stops doing nothing to further exacerbate the preexisting
problem. Accordingly, this evidence contradicts the dominant assumption
that Whren is a significant contributor to racial bias in traffic stops. And it
thus cautions against looking to the Fourth Amendment for a solution to this
critical problem. In its place, we propose that policymakers consider
solutions that will more effectively deter officer behavior, including
extraconstitutional approaches that discipline officer behavior based on their
aggregate set of stops, as opposed to the choices that they make in individual
cases (in which pretext is fundamentally hard to prove).
We acknowledge that we are not the first to analyze this Washington
data and the relevant change in Washington law. Professors Stephen Rushin
and Griffin Edwards, in an article in the Stanford Law Review, also used the
Washington traffic-stop data to examine the impact of the resulting change
in constitutional rights on racial bias in traffic stops.25 But they concluded
that the data indicate that doctrines like Whren’s “contribute to a statistically
significant increase in racial profiling of minority drivers.”26 As previewed
above, our findings suggest no such effect.

25
26
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When presenting our findings, we discuss several areas of departure
between our analysis and that of Rushin and Edwards. Primarily, we build
on their work to implement a novel exercise designed to confront a
fundamental challenge facing this investigation: the need to separate the
effect of the change in Washington’s constitutional treatment of pretextual
stops from its contemporaneous legalization of recreational marijuana. For
these purposes, we take advantage of the fact that Colorado legalized
recreational marijuana within days of Washington but did not alter its
treatment of pretextual stops, allowing us to estimate a triple-differences
specification that effectively uses Colorado as a control in our analysis.
Second, our analyses build on Rushin and Edwards’s with respect to
another key challenge facing this exercise: the fact that driver race is not
recorded for 27% of the stops in the dataset,27 an amount greater than the
proportion of stops with non-white driver race recorded. One of Rushin and
Edwards’s key approaches assumes that all drivers with missing race codes
are non-white.28 We set forth two empirical markers that question the validity
of this assumption. However, we find their alternative approach—dropping
stops with missing race—less problematic.29 We nonetheless expand on that
approach in several ways; primarily, we set forth imputation and other
exercises designed to diagnose the extent of any possible bias that might arise
from the missing-race data. These exercises suggest no concerns over any
such bias.
Third—and perhaps speaking more specifically to why our findings do
not align with those of Rushin and Edwards—we depart from their analysis
in certain functional-form assumptions that we make in constructing our
respective difference-in-difference and triple-differences analyses. Our
reading of their approach is that they test for changes in absolute counts of
traffic stops for non-white drivers before and after the Washington law
change and compare those changes with observed changes in absolute counts
of stops for white drivers before and after the reform. Given substantial
baseline differences in population counts across races and thus in stop counts
across races—especially in large counties—we elect instead to focus on
changes in log counts of traffic stops. This allows us to make comparisons
across races in the proportional (not absolute) responses in traffic stops to
the Washington law change. This provides a more flexible approach that
facilitates a comparison that is not sensitive to the scale of the outcome
variable (and thus the baseline differences) and that arguably captures the
27 Our calculation differs slightly from Rushin and Edwards’s. See id. at 668 n.177 (“Around 26%
of stops by the Washington State Patrol fail to list the race of the driver.”).
28 See id. at 669.
29 See id.
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relationship of interest. We demonstrate that Rushin and Edwards’s results
are rather specific to the functional form they select and are sensitive to this
and related modifications.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, we first lay out the legal
backdrop for our inquiry. Then, we present and question the dominant
position in the literature. We argue that a Fourth Amendment-type right
against pretextual stops would do little to reduce racial disparities in traffic
stops. In Part II, we introduce and analyze the Washington legal change that
serves as the basis for our natural experiment. In Parts III and IV, we explain
our natural experiment and results. In Part V, we discuss the implications of
our results. First, we suggest that the exclusionary rule is an ineffective
deterrent in the context of traffic stops. And second, we very briefly sketch
out avenues for reducing racial bias in traffic stops that are worth exploring
in the alternative.
I. THE QUESTION: WOULD A FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST
PRETEXTUAL STOPS REDUCE RACIAL DISPARITIES IN TRAFFIC STOPS?
A. Legal Background
Under the Fourth Amendment, police are generally able to pull
someone over as long as they witness some traffic violation. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government. 30 And traffic stops are generally considered a Fourth
Amendment seizure.31 A traffic stop is a permitted “reasonable” seizure if
the officer has “‘reasonable suspicion’—that is, ‘a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped’ of breaking the
law.”32 And one way people break the law is by committing traffic violations.
Until the Whren decision in 1996, there was some confusion in the
federal courts about whether a pretextual stop was a reasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.33 Reasonableness is the “ultimate touchstone” of the
Fourth Amendment.34 And one could argue that a stop, although identical to
another stop that would be considered reasonable, is unreasonable when
done for impermissible reasons. In other words, a stop is unreasonable when
the proffered permissible reasons for the stop are merely pretextual.
Alternatively, one could argue that as long as a stop could be justified by a
30

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014).
32 Id. (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014)).
33 Lawton, supra note 22, at 922–23 (describing the circuit split). While there was a circuit split, the
dominant position was that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit pretextual stops. See id. at 922.
34 Heien, 574 U.S. at 60 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014)).
31
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permissible reason—e.g., the officer observed a traffic violation—the stop is
reasonable, even if that reasonable basis was not the officer’s actual
motivation. In Whren, the Court adopted the latter position.
The conflict in Whren began on a June evening in 1993.35 Plainclothes
vice-squad officers in an unmarked car were patrolling a “high drug area” of
D.C. Their “suspicions were aroused” when they saw two young Black
men—James Brown and Michael Whren—in a truck with temporary plates
stopped at a stop sign for more than twenty seconds. The officers noticed the
truck’s driver looking towards the passenger’s lap. The officers made a Uturn to get closer. Brown and Whren turned right without signaling and drove
away “at an ‘unreasonable’ speed.” When the police caught up to the truck,
Officer Soto approached the driver’s window and saw two bags of cocaine
in Whren’s hands. The officers arrested Brown and Whren and found more
drugs in the car.
Brown and Whren sought to suppress the use of the drugs as evidence
at trial.36 They did so by challenging the legality of the traffic stop. They
argued that the officers did not stop them because they sped or because they
failed to signal. Instead, they suggested, the officers actually stopped them
because of an unsubstantiated hunch that Brown and Whren were up to some
other illegal activity. In other words, they contended that their stop was
pretextual and that pretextual stops are not allowed under the Fourth
Amendment. Brown and Whren also argued that because “total compliance
with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police officer will almost
invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a technical violation.”37 So
allowing pretextual stops would allow officers to “decide which motorists to
stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of the car’s
occupants.”38 Thus, they suggested that the Fourth Amendment test should
ask “whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop
for the reason given.”39
The Court held that pretextual stops do not violate the Fourth
Amendment40—as long as there was some traffic violation, the stop is fine,
even if it was really for some other reason, such as a hunch about criminal
activity based on the driver’s race. The decision was unanimous.41 The Court

35 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–09 (1996) (recounting the events described in this
paragraph).
36
See id. at 809.
37 Id. at 810.
38 Id.
39 Id. (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 819.
41 Id. at 807.
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characterized Brown and Whren’s “would have” test as too subjective and
stated: “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”42 Thus, the Court concluded that intentional selective
enforcement of the traffic code based on race was prohibited only under the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 43 So instead of a
“would have” test that would ask whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop in those circumstances, the Court endorsed a “could have”
test, which simply asks whether there was a legal basis for the stop.
B. The Dominant Answer
Whren was met with a firestorm of criticism. One major critique has
been that the decision contributes to racial bias in police stops and that a
different holding—one that recognizes a Fourth Amendment right against
pretextual stops—would reduce that racial bias. 44 As Professor Margaret
Lawton, reviewing the vast scholarly criticism of Whren, notes, “[M]any
legal scholars have argued that use of a ‘reasonable officer’ test, also known
as the ‘would have’ test, would combat the tendency to use traffic infractions
as a pretext . . . and would consequently protect drivers.”45 For example, a
recent empirical study demonstrating racial bias in traffic stops argued: “The
Whren decision opened the floodgates to pretextual stops. Thus, tens of
thousands of black and brown drivers have routinely been stopped and
searched in an effort to reduce drug use.”46
The basic logic of the argument of this dominant story is that when
officers can engage in stops for reasons other than the traffic violation itself,
stops are more likely to be racially biased. This outcome may arise from
officers facing less restraint in acting on baseline racial biases, where such
biases may either arise from racial animus or statistical discrimination along
racial lines in pursuing non-traffic-related crimes. And as a result, per this
42

Id. at 813.
Id. Most agree that the Equal Protection Clause is an ineffectual tool for challenging a racially
biased police stop. For one, “equal protection claims also are notoriously difficult to prove in criminal
cases because they require a defendant to prove intentional discrimination on the basis of race between
otherwise similarly situated individuals.” Brooks Holland, Race and Ambivalent Criminal Procedure
Remedies, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 341, 346 (2011–2012); see Alison Siegler & William Admussen,
Discovering Racial Discrimination by the Police, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 991–93 (2021). And,
importantly, the Equal Protection Clause does not provide a basis for excluding the fruits of an unlawful
stop or impose some other penalty. See Holland, supra, at 346–47.
44 See, e.g., Baumgartner et al., supra note 21, at 108 (criticizing the Whren decision and suggesting
that it has “opened the floodgates” to racially biased traffic stops); Chin & Vernon, supra note 21, at 941
(calling Whren “the Plessy of its era” and claiming that it “encouraged [the] spread” of racial
discrimination by endorsing it); supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
45 Lawton, supra note 22, at 931.
46 Baumgartner et al., supra note 21, at 108.
43
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dominant story, a Fourth Amendment rule that prohibits pretextual stops
might reduce pretextual stops and thus reduce racial disparities in stops. We
are not aware of scholarship affirmatively offering a counternarrative to this
reaction to Whren.47
C. Reasons to Doubt the Dominant Answer
But we see several reasons to doubt the dominant account. We agree
that pretextual stops will tend to fall unevenly across racial lines. However,
even if the courts were to retreat from Whren and strengthen a Fourth
Amendment right against pretextual stops, racial disparities in stops may not
actually subside. Why? Because certain inherent features of this Fourth
Amendment tool may simply fail to shape police behavior—that is, fail to
deter officers from conducting pretextual stops. “A right is as big, precisely,
as what the courts will do.” 48 And in the context of traffic stops, the
exclusionary rule—the Fourth Amendment’s primary enforcement
mechanism—does little.
In this Section, we will first introduce and explain the two main
elements of our theory of why a Fourth Amendment right against pretextual
stops might not actually reduce bad stops—the difficulty in proving pretext
and the fact that the remedy associated with a Fourth Amendment violation
is not well suited to regulating an officer’s decision to initiate a stop. Then,
to illustrate our theory, we will walk through the types of stops that are most
likely to feature some racial bias and discuss the officer’s incentives in each
case. At the outset, we emphasize that the reasons we provide to doubt the
dominant account described above—and the resulting ambiguity in our
expectations about the effects of a stricter Fourth Amendment standard on
racial bias in stops—are precisely why we need careful empirical analysis.
That is what animates this Article.
1. Proving a Violation
Even with a Fourth Amendment right against pretextual stops,
defendants would likely find it difficult to prove that a given stop was
pretextual. Often, the only witnesses to the stop will be the driver and the

47 That being said, the force of our Article does not entirely rest on the contention that those raising
concerns of Whren’s possible contributions to bias are indeed the “dominant” view. And the main thrust
of our empirical exercise is not to offer a formal, systematic review of this literature. Rather, we
emphasize that based on our understanding of the literature, there is an important body of scholarship that
has raised this view of Whren, and we are setting out to challenge this contention through the
consideration of a quasi-experimental design. At an even more specific level, we are setting out to
challenge the empirical support for this view of Whren that was set forth by Rushin & Edwards, supra
note 21.
48 K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 84 (1951).
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officer. In such cases, it seems unlikely that a court will conclude that the
stop was pretextual. First, it is not inconceivable that officers might shape
their testimony to fit the law, fudge facts, or even lie.49 Indeed, in a relatively
recent series of interviews, judges and prosecutors in Chicago “willingly
admitted that police perjury was part of the culture of the court system in
Cook County.”50
Second, judges might be inclined to take an officer’s word over the
defendant’s.51 There is a long history of judicial deference to the police.52 For
one, the judge’s view might be colored by the fact that the officer did in fact
find something when searching the defendant.53 In a suppression hearing at
which the Fourth Amendment objection would arise, the judge already
knows that incriminating evidence was found, perhaps leaving the
impression of an untrustworthy defendant. In addition, judges could have
strategic reasons for siding with the police. Judges might want to avoid
appearing weak on crime54 and maintain institutional relationships.55
Building on the above points, of course, are the inherent difficulties in
establishing subjective intent and demonstrating pretext. As we will discuss
in Part II, Washington’s temporary retreat from Whren involved a rule with
a subjective component, and our review of Washington case law revealed the
difficulty in proving impermissible motive under a rule that required an
interrogation of the officer’s actual motives. In particular, it seemed that
49 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1037, 1040 (1996); Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and
Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2445–46 (2017).
50 Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, Opinion, Chicago’s Racist Cops and Racist Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/opinion/chicagos-racist-cops-and-racist-courts.
html [https://perma.cc/E6RN-MLGB] (“Twenty of the 27 judges I interviewed said that police perjury
occurred, six did not directly respond, and only one said that it did not occur.”).
51 See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112–13 (2003)
(suggesting that, in cases involving murderers and rapists, judges close their eyes and side with the police
even when they suspect police perjury).
52 See Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2000
(2017).
53 Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
363, 376; William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 912 (1991)
(“It must be much harder for a judge to decide that an officer had something less than probable cause to
believe cocaine was in the trunk of a defendant’s car when the cocaine was in fact there.”); Nancy Leong,
Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 434–37 (2012).
54 See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in
the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 115, 121 n.210 (1992) (stating that six of twelve
judges, six of fourteen prosecutors, and twelve of fourteen public defenders believed that judges
sometimes failed to suppress evidence despite a Fourth Amendment violation, sometimes for political
reasons).
55 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 912–13 (2006).
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absent an actual admission of an impermissible motive by the officer, it was
quite uncommon for courts to find pretext, especially given the general
deference afforded the police by the courts.56
Altogether, the deck seems stacked against defendants, even if a Fourth
Amendment right was violated in truth. Even if the courts were to take a
harsher Fourth Amendment stance against pretextual stops, these inherent
evidentiary obstacles would weaken the bite of the Fourth Amendment as a
potential tool and thus its ability to truly discourage officers from engaging
in pretextual stops.
2. The Lack of a Meaningful Remedy
The exclusionary rule is the main remedy for a Fourth Amendment
violation,57 especially in the context of traffic stops.58 The exclusionary rule
says that any evidence acquired as a fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation
cannot be used against the defendant at trial. 59 The exclusionary rule was
initially understood to be a constitutionally mandated remedy.60 But it has

56 See, e.g., State v. Cloe, No. 29007-3-II, 2003 WL 22137290, at *1–5 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 16,
2003). In that case, the officer testified that he stopped the defendant because he saw the defendant’s car
turning off of 109th Avenue without using an indicator. In the course of the stop, the officer discovered
bags of methamphetamine. The defendant, however, testified that he was never on 109th Avenue, instead
claiming that he left a friend’s house on 110th Avenue and was stopped as he turned onto 112th Avenue,
and he argued that the stop was pretextual. Even though the defendant set forth facts that undermined the
basis for the alleged traffic violation and even though the officer’s testimony revealed that he knew that
the friend’s house was a suspected drug house and that the area was a high-crime area, the trial court still
found that the officer’s testimony was more credible than the defendant’s, and the appellate court
dismissed the defendant’s pretextual-stop argument.
Our review of the case law did reveal some situations in which it appears that pretext was established,
but only where that determination was supported by an officer admission (further reinforcing the point
that an admission to this effect may be what it takes to prove pretext in a subjective-intent regime). See,
e.g., State v. Cramer, No. 17953-2-III, 2000 WL 1663641, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2000).
Interestingly, this case law review also suggested that how forthcoming officers may be in their testimony
is sensitive to the prevailing legal regime. Most of these cases with officer admissions were cases in which
the suppression hearing took place before the Ladson decision, but the appeal took place after, meaning
that the admissions were made before the officer could have known that such an admission would affect
the stop’s validity. See, e.g., State v. Moore, No. 43692-9-I, 1999 WL 1138575, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 13, 1999) (noting that the suppression hearing took place before the Ladson decision); see also infra
text accompanying note 82 (discussing the Ladson holding). But once Ladson fully set in, we no longer
saw such testimony—admittedly, our records review only looked at appellate opinions in which such
testimony was discussed.
57 See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 10 (2009) (explaining that the exclusionary rule “is by far the most commonly used means of
discouraging police misconduct and perhaps the most successful”).
58 Other remedies such as civil suits against the officer are ineffective in this context because the
monetary compensation for an unlawful traffic stop is unlikely to be worth the effort and cost of a lawsuit
for the average driver.
59 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961).
60 See id.

1495

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

evolved into a remedy justified solely by its ability to deter police
misconduct.61
There are reasons to doubt, however, whether the exclusionary rule can
shape police decisions about traffic stops, even if attached to a right against
pretextual stops. 62 First, for a punishment to shape behavior, it should
regularly track the bad behavior. That is, when bad stops occur the
punishment should regularly be imposed, and when good stops occur the
punishment should not apply.63 But this does not happen in the context of
traffic stops and the exclusionary-rule “punishment.”
Most traffic stops—good or bad—do not turn up incriminating
evidence.64 Indeed, police might sometimes stop a driver with the intent to
harass65 or simply to meet a quota.66 But the exclusionary rule only kicks in
to exclude evidence that the state would like to introduce at a trial. So,
finding incriminating evidence is a prerequisite to its application. Thus, even
if the Fourth Amendment did prohibit pretextual stops, there is a good chance
that violations might not be subject to even the possibility that the
exclusionary rule will apply.
And even within the set of stops that do turn up incriminating evidence,
there are several other reasons the exclusionary rule may not come into play.
First, few resulting criminal cases will actually go to trial, where the
potentially excludable evidence would be used. For one, in many cases the

See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (“The rule’s sole purpose, we have
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.”).
62 Our argument is not that the exclusionary rule should not apply to traffic-stop-based evidence. Our
point is much narrower: that because the exclusionary rule is weak in this area, Fourth Amendment-based
attempts to regulate police traffic-stop behavior are unlikely to succeed. Many of the more general forms
of our arguments here were first made in Slobogin, supra note 53.
63 See id. at 373–74.
64 See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1895 (2014);
Harmon, supra note 57, at 10–11 (“[T]he scope of the exclusionary rule is inevitably much narrower than
the scope of illegal police misconduct. The exclusionary rule provides a remedy only when police seek
to use evidence that results from misconduct at a criminal trial. It therefore discourages officer misconduct
only when the misconduct may produce evidence and when the government would value using that
evidence at trial. Many kinds of misconduct do not have these characteristics. For example, Terry stops
might be done primarily to harass or intimidate, and police uses of excessive force rarely produce
evidence of a crime.”); Pierson et al., supra note 17, at 739.
65 See Harmon, supra note 57, at 11.
66 See Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?,
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 442 (2002–2003); Joel Rose, Despite Laws and Lawsuits, Quota-Based
Policing Lingers, NPR (Apr. 4, 2015, 4:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/04/395061810/despitelaws-and-lawsuits-quota-based-policing-lingers [https://perma.cc/382X-HQ5E].
61
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police might not make an arrest.67 And even if an arrest is made, the case
might not make it to trial. For instance, the defendant might take a plea deal.68
And even if the case does go to trial, the Fourth Amendment violation might
not matter because it might not be raised. This is a distinct possibility in the
context of pretextual stops because the defendant might not even suspect that
the stop was not for the traffic violation.
And even if a Fourth Amendment objection is raised in a regime that
prohibits pretextual stops, there might still fail to be a serious “punishment”
incurred for the unconstitutional act. For one, the fruits of an unconstitutional
search can still be admitted via exceptions to the exclusionary rule, such as
the independent source, 69 inevitable discovery, 70 attenuation, 71 and good
faith72 carve-outs. Further, even if evidence is excluded, the jury might still
find the defendant guilty on the weight of other nonexcluded evidence. And
finally, even if the exclusionary rule kicks in, the evidence is excluded, and
that defendant is found not guilty as a result, Fourth Amendment standing
rules allow evidence obtained in violation of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights to be used against someone else in court.73 So there is a
possibility that the fruits of a judicially recognized unconstitutional stop can
still be used to get a conviction against someone.
The upshot is that the exclusionary rule might not be an effective
punishment tool in the vast majority of bad stops. And with the threat of
exclusion in the context of traffic stops not being a serious ex ante threat, it
is unlikely to meaningfully shape police behavior.74
The exclusionary rule’s inadequacies in the context of traffic stops do
not stop there. Even if a punishment properly tracks the desirable and
undesirable behavior, for it to shape behavior and deter the targeted act, it
has to be seen by the actor as negatively impacting that actor. There are
numerous reasons for skepticism here.
When deciding whether to initiate a traffic stop, it is possible that many
officers do not care much about whether their stop results in a conviction.
67 See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 374–75; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (stating that
the exclusionary rule “is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the
police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest
of serving some other goal”).
68 But a defendant’s sense about whether evidence will be excluded might shape his calculation about
whether to take a plea deal and what sort of deal to take.
69
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
70 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
71 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
72 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009).
73 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978).
74 See Slobogin, supra note 53, at 373–80.
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Often, officers care much more about arrests than convictions—a sense that
is reinforced by the metrics that determine career advancement. 75 In the
context of traffic stops, the officer might care more about getting a certain
number of stops on the books to meet a quota than about whether the stop
will result in finding and prosecuting criminal activity. 76 Further, many
officers feel that they lack control over whether their arrest results in a
conviction because they associate the failure to convict with a litany of
external factors.77 As a result, some officers might not see a nonconviction
as a punishment for their Fourth Amendment violation.78 Instead, driving
their decision over whether to initiate a stop are various other factors.
Moreover, some officers may care about a conviction but may see little
cost arising from the exclusion of evidence resulting from a pretextual stop.
After all, even if some evidence that is found gets excluded, the officer might
never have gotten that evidence absent the stop in the first place.
Accordingly, they may see that outcome as not actually negatively impacting
the overall chances of conviction.
In sum, given the difficulties involved in proving pretext and given the
weaknesses of the exclusionary rule as a remedy that is likely to influence
officers, it is questionable whether the Fourth Amendment can serve as a tool
that effectively shapes officers’ traffic-stop behavior. To the extent this is
true, it is therefore questionable that Whren can be seen as meaningfully
contributing to the racial disparities in traffic stops that unquestionably exist.
3. Our Theory in Context
To further explain and illustrate our theory of why a Fourth Amendment
right against pretextual stops will not actually reduce bad stops, we
conceptualize several different types of stops that are likely to contribute to
racial disparities and then assess the potential for the Fourth Amendment to
deter racial bias in each scenario. In doing so we demonstrate that there are
very few hypothetical instances in which a Fourth Amendment right against
pretextual stops is likely to change police behavior.
The first type of traffic stop that we conceptualize as contributing to
racial disparities is when the officer intends to be unbiased in deciding whom
to stop and intends to enforce traffic violations specifically, but because of
unconscious biases the officer disproportionately stops non-white drivers. In
these cases, the officer has no reason to consider whether her stop is legally
75

See id. at 377–78.
See id. at 378.
77 Cf. id. at 377–78 (“But the sociological literature strongly suggests that the primary goal of officers
in the field in the average case is to get a ‘collar.’ If they do, they’ve done their job. It is the prosecutor’s
job to convict.” (footnote omitted)).
78 See id. at 378.
76
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problematic because she herself does not know that she is stopping the driver
for something other than the traffic violation and does not know that she is
doing so differentially based on race. And because she is primarily motivated
by a desire to enforce the traffic code in a uniform manner, she is unlikely to
consider whether evidence she might uncover in the course of the stop will
be inadmissible in a future trial. Thus, the exclusionary threat is unlikely to
shape her decision about whom to stop.
The second hypothetical scenario is when the officer intends to be
biased in her stops simply to harass non-white drivers. Take for example the
candid statements of a state trooper regarding a stop that happened where we
both live—Durham, North Carolina. When the trooper was asked why he
stopped the driver for a seat-belt violation, he responded:
“Everyone knows that a Hispanic male buying liquor on a Friday or Saturday
night is probably already drunk”; “Mexicans drink a lot because they grew up
where the water isn’t good”; and that he did not care what happened in court
“as long as I get them [(i.e. Hispanic males)] off the road and in jail for one
night.”79

When asked whether he targets Hispanics, the trooper said: “I’m not
targeting Hispanics. Most of my tickets go to blacks.”80 When officers’ goals
are primarily to harass, stopping and harassing may be good enough for
them. The possibility of the exclusionary rule barring evidence from the stop
at trial may simply be an inconsequential input into their decision-making
process.
The third hypothetical type of race-based stop we consider is when the
officer needs to pull some people over for traffic violations—e.g., to fulfill a
quota—and determines that she might as well pull over drivers that she
deems are most likely to have contraband or other evidence of crime. Either
consciously or subconsciously, this hypothetical officer may then feel that
she is most likely to find such evidence on non-white drivers. The application
of a harsher “would have” Fourth Amendment test may have a greater chance
of deterring this officer from proceeding with the racially biased pretextual
stop relative to the hypothetical officers from the first two scenarios.
However, even in this scenario, it is perhaps unlikely that a Fourth
Amendment right against pretextual stops will do much for the various
reasons set forth in the preceding Section: (1) the officer may care about the
possibility of exclusion, but she might severely discount its probability given
the difficulties in proving pretext; (2) the officer may not feel that there is a
79 State v. Villeda, 599 S.E.2d 62, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (alteration in original and emphasis
added).
80 Id.
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real cost to the exclusionary rule since, even if the evidence is excluded, it
might never have been retrieved absent the stop; or (3) the officer may not
care about the possibility of exclusion if her motivations are focused more
on arrests than convictions.
The fourth type of race-based stop that we consider arises when a
hypothetical officer only cares about criminal activity other than traffic stops
and where the officer initiates a stop based on a hunch that is tainted by racial
bias—e.g., they may pull over a non-white driver based on their assessment
that the crime in which they are interested is more likely to have been
committed by a non-white actor. Out of the four scenarios discussed, this is
the one in which it is most likely that the application of a harsher “would
have” Fourth Amendment test would deter the hypothetical officer from
executing the pretextual stop. 81 Unlike the first scenario discussed, this
hypothetical officer is well aware that her actions might trigger legal
scrutiny, as her hypothesized motivation is indeed to engage in pretextual
behavior. Moreover, relative to the third scenario just discussed, it is perhaps
more likely that this hypothetical officer will care about the exclusion of
evidence and about the conviction of the suspect given our assumption
regarding her primary objectives to pursue the non-traffic-related crimes.
However, for some of the other reasons just raised in the third scenario,
there are still reasons to doubt whether even the hypothetical officer in this
fourth scenario may be deterred by a “would have” Fourth Amendment test
that prohibits pretextual stops and that enforces this prohibition via the
exclusionary rule. For one, the officer may still discount the probability of
the exclusionary rule being applied given evidentiary barriers that are still
likely to apply in this instance—e.g., if the officer does not admit that the
reason for the stop was pretextual, it might be very difficult to prove.
Moreover, as above, even if the officer thought that there was a real risk that
a judge would say the stop violated the Fourth Amendment, the officer may
not deem the exclusion of any evidence a significant cost. For DUI and drugpossession hunches, the driver will probably be long gone before the officer
can develop the requisite suspicion to justify the stop. Accordingly, even if
the fruits of the stop are inadmissible, she would not have been able to get
the evidence without the stop and is thus in no worse of a position.

81 As a starting point, we note that the application of a “would have” test could lead to the exclusion
of any evidence arising from a stop under the scenario. Stepping back, under Whren’s “could have” test,
as long as there was some traffic violation, these stops are upheld. See supra notes 41–43 and
accompanying text. But, under a “would have” test, a defendant could argue that an officer who was not
acting based on an unsubstantiated hunch would not have pulled him over. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
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All of this is of course highly speculative. We do not know how many
stops are for each of these reasons or whether there are other significant types
of racially biased stops that escaped us. Nor do we know for a fact that we
have accurately captured officers’ decision-making processes in these
situations—which are unlikely to be monolithic. Our main objective with
this discussion is to simply raise doubts regarding the conventional wisdom
that the more permissive “could have” approach embraced by Whren is
contributing to racial disparities in traffic stops and that a harsher “would
have” approach would instead reduce such disparities. We now endeavor to
help resolve this ambiguity by turning to a natural experiment born out of a
change in constitutional law in the State of Washington.
II. WASHINGTON AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT
Three years after the U.S. Supreme Court in Whren held that the federal
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment allows pretextual stops, the Washington
Supreme Court held that Washington’s constitutional analogue to the Fourth
Amendment prohibits pretextual stops.82
That case—State v. Ladson83—sets the stage for the natural experiment
we investigate in this Article. Ladson reasoned that the Washington
constitution generally bars warrantless searches and seizures. One exception
is for traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has
occurred. The reason for that exception is based on the premise that such
stops are done to enforce the traffic code—a sort of community caretaking
exception to the general prohibition on warrantless seizures. The exception,
the court stated, was not made so that police could better investigate criminal
activity. Indeed, in Washington, traffic violations had been decriminalized.
Thus, a stop in response to a traffic violation is by definition not a stop to
investigate criminal activity. In fact, the Washington Supreme Court noted
that part of the reason the state legislature decriminalized traffic violations
was to prevent pretextual stops. So the court was unwilling to allow a
community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement to serve as a
backdoor to an investigative stop. As a result, the court held that the
Washington constitution’s analogue to the Fourth Amendment prohibits
pretextual stops. 84 It suggested that a stop is pretextual when the traffic
violation (or the constitutionally permissible reason for the stop) is not “the

82
83
84

State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
See id. at 837–39, 841–42 (recounting the legal background of the case).
Id. at 842.
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true reason” for the stop.85 To determine whether a stop is pretextual, the
Ladson court instructed that a reviewing court should consider both the
objective reasonableness of the stop and the officer’s subjective intent.86
Thirteen years after Ladson, in December 2012, the Washington
Supreme Court pulled back from its broad language and instated a standard
functionally equivalent to Whren. In State v. Arreola, the Washington
Supreme Court purported to maintain that pretextual stops are
unconstitutional but severely narrowed what counts as a pretextual stop.
Arreola held that a mixed-motive stop—a stop done for both permissible and
impermissible reasons—is not a pretextual stop. 87 As long as the traffic
infraction was “an actual, conscious, and independent cause of the traffic
stop,” the stop does not violate Washington’s Fourth Amendment analogue.88
This is true even if the primary reason for the stop was an impermissible
one89—such as an unsubstantiated hunch based on the driver’s race.
For our analysis of the effect of the Arreola decision on racial
disparities in traffic stops to be informative on the effects that Whren has
had, it needs to be the case that the Ladson-to-Arreola shift represented a
true legal change—i.e., that the Washington courts between Ladson and
Arreola indeed applied a harsh standard against pretextual stops and that the
courts post-Arreola indeed relaxed the standard employed. To confirm this,
we reviewed every Washington appellate case citing either Ladson or
Arreola. They tell us that there was a real change in Washington’s
constitutional law. They also tell us that the Ladson test was stricter on police
officers than either Whren or the “would have” test, while the Arreola test is
the functional equivalent of Whren. Let us elaborate.
Under Ladson, the traffic violation had to be the actual reason for the
stop. As an illustration, take State v. Capshaw, a pre-Arreola case. There, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court that the relevant test under Ladson
is “whether the facially valid reason for the stop is ‘sufficiently primary’
among the various possible reasons for the stop.”90 In other words, to be
legal, the traffic violation needed to have been more than just a reason for

See id. (“We conclude the citizens of Washington have held, and are entitled to hold, a
constitutionally protected interest against warrantless traffic stops or seizures on a mere pretext to
dispense with the warrant when the true reason for the seizure is not exempt from the warrant requirement.
We therefore hold pretextual traffic stops violate article I, section 7, because they are seizures absent the
‘authority of law’ which a warrant would bring.” (citing WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7)).
86 Id. at 843.
87 See 290 P.3d 983, 991 (Wash. 2012).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 991–92.
90 No. 29204-1-II, 2003 WL 21964788, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2003) (emphasis added).
85
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the stop. Another example is State v. Meckelson. There, the court asked,
“Was the officer’s stop solely for the driver’s failure to signal?”91
This is different than the Arreola standard because under Arreola it does
not matter how important the traffic-infraction motivation for the stop is
compared to other motivations as long as the traffic-infraction motivation
was sufficient to be an actual, conscious, and independent reason for the stop.
The post-Arreola cases confirm this. Take, for example, State v. Burr, in
which the court said, “Even if . . . [the impermissible reason] was the primary
reason for the stop, under Arreola, this inference does not alter our
analysis . . . [so long as the officer] had an actual, conscious, and
independent reason to stop Burr based on the traffic infraction.”92
Thus, the cases confirm the following descriptions of the tests.
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF TESTS
Test
Whren
“Would have”
test
Arreola

Ladson

Standard
“Could have” test: Is there a legal basis for the stop?
Would a reasonable officer have made the stop in
those circumstances?
Was the legally permissible reason for the stop (the
traffic violation) an actual, conscious, and
independent reason for the stop?
Was the legally permissible reason for the stop (the
traffic violation) the actual reason for the stop?

Type
Purely objective
Mostly objective
Subjective plus
objective
Subjective plus
objective

Ladson is the strictest test. It easily takes a harsher stance on pretextual
stops than either Whren or Arreola because under Ladson, even if the traffic
violation was actually a reason for the stop, it might still be unconstitutional.
Ladson even surpasses the “would have” test that scholars have endorsed.
Under Ladson, even if a reasonable officer would have made the stop in those
circumstances, if the officer did not in fact make the stop for the traffic
violation, the stop is unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, Arreola is functionally equivalent to Whren. Under Whren,
there need only have been a traffic violation. Under Arreola, there must have
been a traffic violation and that violation must have at least crossed the
officer’s mind when deciding whether to make a stop. But there is likely no
meaningful difference between the two tests. Under either test, the officer
has to make sure there is a traffic violation to make the stop. So the traffic
violation will almost always be on the officer’s mind when she makes a stop.

91
92

135 P.3d 991, 993–94 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added).
No. 70055-3-I, 2014 WL 1711567, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2014).
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Thus, the traffic violation will always be a reason for the stop, making
Arreola’s additional subjective requirement largely superfluous. A
functional difference between Whren and Arreola would probably only arise
in cases in which an officer admits that the only thing on her mind when
making the stop was the impermissible reason for the stop (though a
reasonable officer could have executed the stop). In that case, if a traffic
violation had in fact occurred, the stop would be upheld under Whren but
struck down under Arreola. But such a situation seems exceedingly unlikely.
Indeed, we found no cases post-Arreola in which a traffic stop was deemed
unconstitutional under Washington’s analogue to the Fourth Amendment.
Because Arreola meaningfully altered the standard applied in
adjudicating pretextual stops, the legal change in Washington presents a
good opportunity to test whether a Fourth Amendment right is likely to affect
racial bias in police stops.
For example, imagine a pre-Arreola Washington in which a state patrol
officer received a tip of a drug purchase that had just occurred in a
neighborhood. The officer noticed a car driving in the neighborhood that the
officer had a hunch might be the car driven by the purchaser, but the officer
did not think that her hunch amounted to reasonable suspicion that would
justify the stop. Nonetheless, the officer stopped the driver, citing a broken
taillight, a minor traffic infraction. If the reviewing court felt that the main
reason for the stop was to investigate the drug purchase and not the traffic
infraction, the stop would be deemed unconstitutional and any evidence
about the drug purchase obtained during the stop would be thrown out under
Ladson.
But after Arreola, as long as the officer can say that one actual,
conscious, and independent reason for the stop was the broken taillight, then
the stop will be held constitutional. This is true even if the broken light was
not the primary reason for the stop. Now, imagine that the officer’s hunch
over the drug purchase was racially biased—e.g., the officer perceived that
non-white drivers are more likely to purchase drugs in the neighborhood in
question. In this case, the greater discretion extended by Arreola to enact a
stop based on this hunch may contribute to greater racial disparities in the
initiation of stops.
Accordingly, the Arreola decision—by capturing real variation in the
stringency of Fourth Amendment protection—offers an opportunity to test
the dominant theory that this protection may indeed have a bearing on racial
disparities in stops. To the extent we do document such a responsiveness,
that result would tend to support the dominant concern that the permissive
“could have” approach embraced by Whren is causing a greater degree of
racial disparities in stops than would otherwise be present under a more
1504
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restrictive standard. Of course, just because we have validated that courts
will apply a lightened standard in the Arreola era does not mean that officer
behavior will respond in the way predicted by the dominant theory. This was
the exact point of Part I of this Article. No matter how stringent one sets the
standard regarding pretextual steps, there may be certain inherent features of
this Fourth Amendment tool that dampen the deterrent channel connecting
the court proceedings to the officer’s decision-making process. Again, it is
this doubt that will motivate our empirical analysis, to which we now turn.
III. DATA AND PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON ARREOLA
A. Data
Our empirical analysis of the effects of Arreola on racial bias in the
initiation of traffic stops will rely upon traffic-stop data from several
jurisdictions. Each of these jurisdictional databases was provided by the
Stanford Open Policing Project.93 Given our intent to explore the effects of a
change in law in Washington, our primary source of data on traffic stops is
the Washington State Patrol database. As will be discussed below, we focus
on analyzing stops occurring between 2010 and 2015 in our main analyses.
These data record various pieces of information on the over 7 million stops
occurring over that time, including (1) the date and time of day (in one-hour
increments) of the stop, (2) the county of the stop (in addition to location
information at the subcounty level), and (3) the driver’s race, sex, and age.
To implement certain secondary analyses—as we will discuss in greater
depth below—we also draw on traffic-stop data from 2010 to 2015 from the
Colorado State Patrol (roughly 2.5 million stops) and from the Seattle Police
Department (roughly 160,000 stops). Data for these additional jurisdictions
also come from the Stanford Open Policing Project.94 In certain robustness
checks, we extend the above data sources until 2017 and 2018, as we discuss
further below.
B. Prior Analysis and Preview of Findings
Before getting into our analysis, we note that we are not the first to
analyze the Washington traffic-stop data before and after Arreola to
investigate the potential for a right against pretextual stops to combat racial
bias in police stops. Professors Rushin and Edwards analyzed the data first
and conclude “Arreola . . . [is] associated with statistically significant

93 Data, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/data/ [https://perma.cc/
YS29-68L5]. The data were compiled in connection with Pierson et al., supra note 17.
94 Data, supra note 93.
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increases in stops of Black drivers, Hispanic drivers, and drivers of ‘other’
races relative to white drivers.”95 They go on to suggest that if the Court had
ruled differently in Whren, that might have “reduced racial bias by
officers.” 96 As Rushin and Edwards state, if their findings gain wide
acceptance, Ladson’s holding might serve as a blueprint for regulating
pretextual stops.97
By way of preview, our findings differ from those presented by Rushin
and Edwards. Our own findings can be interpreted in one of two ways. In the
most aggressive light, our findings suggest that Arreola made no marginal
contribution—or at most a modest contribution—to racial disparities in
officers’ decisions to initiate traffic stops, which would suggest that our
solution to the undeniable problem of racial bias underlying such stops
should not lie with a Fourth Amendment-like approach. In a more
conservative light—considering the challenges involved in distinguishing a
“null effects” story from a “zero effects” story—our results can be read as
suggesting that, when taking a range of robust approaches to testing the
effects of Arreola on racial disparities in stops, we fail to find evidence to
suggest that it increased such disparities.98
From either perspective, our results cast substantial doubt on the
conclusions reached by Professors Rushin and Edwards in their investigation
into Arreola’s effects on traffic stops. In the analysis and results that we
present below, we address the various ways in which our respective analyses
depart from one another.

95

Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, at 669.
Id.
97 Id.
98 One argument in favor of this more conservative takeaway is that the approach considered by
Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, and that we build upon still relies upon just one state that has modified
its constitutional protections against pretextual stops. While that fact alone does not raise concerns over
biased estimates, it increases concerns that spurious shocks to the stop rates of non-white drivers may
happen to coincide with the post-Arreola period and confound our analysis. With a large number of
treatment states, these spurious shocks would be more likely to average out to zero. See Timothy G.
Conley & Christopher R. Taber, Inference with “Difference in Differences” with a Small Number of
Policy Changes, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 113, 113 (2011) (noting that point estimates in difference-indifference regressions with a small number of policy changes are statistically inconsistent). Further
challenges arise with a small number of treatment states when estimating the standard errors associated
with the difference-in-difference coefficients. See id. Of course, the two-alternative triple-differences
specifications estimated in Part IV are designed to address some of these concerns, though those empirical
models likewise require certain assumptions to interpret the results in causal terms, as we set forth below.
For these reasons, we note that the most conservative reading of our results is not in establishing that
Arreola had no effect on racial disparities in stop rates but that we have failed to find evidence of any
such effects through the methods we have available.
96
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Overview of Empirical Investigation
To recap our discussion above, our aim in this Article is to test the
dominant theory that a permissive constitutional standard regarding
pretextual stops—such as that set forth in Whren—contributes to increased
stops of non-white drivers. To test this theory, we draw upon the 2012
Arreola decision by the Washington Supreme Court, which took the State of
Washington from a stringent regime that prohibited pretextual stops to a
more permissive regime that is functionally equivalent to that of Whren.
Accordingly, we aim to test in this Part whether stops of non-white drivers
increased following Arreola. Our analysis will demonstrate that no matter
how we address certain empirical challenges, we consistently fail to find
evidence to suggest that Arreola contributed to an increase in the rate of stops
of non-white drivers (or Black drivers specifically).
At the outset, we reiterate that we are assuming that racial bias in traffic
stops does exist. That is, we do not believe that a reasonable interpretation
of the null results that we present is that there is no underlying racial bias in
the first place. Any such interpretation would simply be inconsistent with the
world around us. Similarly, we do not set out in this Article to empirically
demonstrate that there is an underlying racial basis in traffic stops—that is,
we do not try to test a null hypothesis that such bias does not exist.99 Taking
the existence of such bias as unquestionable, our empirical inquiry instead
will be focused on assessing whether and how the law may be able to address
this fundamental problem.
Before diving into this analysis, we caution that our analysis—though
it attempts to draw broader inferences about the effects of Fourth
Amendment-like treatments of pretextual stops—is based on the analysis of
just one state intervention. We acknowledge that this leaves us with both
internal and external validity concerns. For instance, regarding external
validity, even if our analysis accurately identifies the effect of substantive
constitutional treatment of pretextual stops on officer behavior in
Washington, that effect may not generalize to officers in other states. While
we concede this possibility, we note that we have no particular reason to
doubt the generalizability of our findings.

99 For the same reason, we also do not set forth a robust literature review on those studies that have
attempted to demonstrate racial bias in traffic stops. That said, we do make note of a recent study that has
at least demonstrated that this bias is pervasive across officers, rather than just being concentrated among
a few “bad apples.” See Felipe Goncalves & Steven Mello, A Few Bad Apples? Racial Bias in Policing,
111 AM. ECON. REV. 1406, 1426 (2021) (finding that 42% of officers are discriminatory in a study
analyzing data from the Florida Highway Patrol on the charged speed for speeding tickets).
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Regarding internal validity concerns stemming from our Washingtoncentric analysis, consider one of the key challenges we will face below—i.e.,
to distinguish between an effect of Arreola on racial disparities in traffic
stops and the effects of other shocks that may hit Washington in the postArreola period that also impact the rate by which non-white drivers may be
stopped. If we were able to observe more states experimenting with
constitutional treatment of pretextual stops in the way Washington did, we
would be able to build an even richer quasi-experiment to help separate the
causal effect of the constitutional treatment from the effects of other factors
that may impact the stop rate of non-white drivers. If our only approach were
to compare the stop rates of non-white and white drivers within Washington
before and after Arreola, we agree that our focus on just one state would be
a limitation. Our analysis goes deeper than that, however, in ways that will
allow us to address matters of this nature and better target the effects
stemming from the Arreola decision itself. As we will discuss below, we will
estimate two types of triple-differences models that will help us achieve this
necessary separation.
B. Difference-in-Difference Analysis: Overview
As set forth in Part I, according to the dominant theory, Arreola’s
permissive standard for pretextual stops would lead to an increase in the rate
of stops of non-white drivers (or of Black drivers, specifically). If we were
to simply test whether the rate of non-white stops increased after Arreola,
we would immediately confront a key empirical challenge. Traffic-stop rates
will change over time for other reasons. For instance, perhaps state-trooper
rosters increased or decreased over this time frame. Perhaps people drive
more or less frequently over time. If we had data on all such developments,
we could, of course, simply include them as control variables in a regression
analyis. However, even if we could collect data on some such stories, we
may remain concerned over what we cannot observe.
To confront this immediate challenge, we will explore how the rates of
stops of non-white drivers relative to that of white drivers change before and
after Arreola (in the alternative, we will focus on Black drivers, specifically).
That is, we will look at the difference between non-white and white stop rates
and analyze how that difference evolved over time as Washington’s
constitutional treatment of pretextual stops changed. In essence, this strategy
uses white drivers as a control group—i.e., it uses the change in the rate of
stops of white drivers after Arreola as a way to estimate those unobservable
factors that are changing over time and that may impact traffic-stop rates.
Having done so, we can then subtract that before–after white-driver effect
from the before–after change for non-white drivers in order to isolate the
1508
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effect of Arreola and net out the influence of the confounding factors. An
empirical strategy of this nature goes by the name of a “difference-indifference” design.100
Of course, for this strategy to rule out the influence of these
unobservable factors, one must assume that such factors affect non-white and
white drivers alike. For instance, one must assume that changes in statepatrol rosters over time will affect non-white stop rates the same way they
affect white stop rates. In other words, this strategy will allow for trends in
non-white stop rates and white stop rates that bounce up and down in parallel
over time due to unobservable shocks that are common to both groups. It will
then attempt to explore whether these trends stop moving in parallel after the
Arreola decision and whether those trends instead begin to diverge as the
gap between stop rates widens.
In the next Section, we will begin to lay out difference-in-difference
findings of this nature. We note, however, that we will return to the
assumption set forth in the preceding paragraph after presenting these
preliminary results. We will then discuss strategies that we employ that will
allow us to relax that assumption and to estimate the effect of Arreola while
accounting for unobservable factors that change over time and that are even
specific to given races.
Before laying out these preliminary findings, we make one additional
preliminary note regarding the time frame of our investigation. In our
difference-in-difference exercises, we focus on a three-year postreform
period. We acknowledge that one limitation of this evaluation window is that
it may preclude the observation of a true effect that happens to occur with a
lag longer than three years—e.g., because officers may not begin to respond
to the altered legal landscape for at least three years. This is a valid caveat,
but we must balance it against one of the limitations of the difference-indifference approach, especially when this approach draws on just one
treatment state. Most specifically, our key challenge with this difference-indifference design comes in assuming that the white and non-white stop rates
would have trended in the same manner absent the Arreola decision. The
longer out we look, the more dubious this assumption becomes given that
the longer out we look, the more likely it is that we will encounter another
reform or occurrence in Washington that will lead to differential effects in
stop rates across race. 101 To balance our concerns over possibly lagged
100 For an introduction to the difference-in-difference theory, see generally JOSHUA D. ANGRIST &
JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 245–46
(2008).
101 With a greater number of treatment states, we could perhaps more reliably estimate longer run
effects, as spurious shocks to stop rates would likely average out to zero.
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officer responses and Washington-specific reforms that have differential
racial impacts on stop rates, we select a three-year window in our primary
approach.
That said, this balance is arguably altered in our triple-differences
designs—e.g., when we further compare rates in Washington and Colorado
and when we compare rates during the day and overnight. These designs
employ additional layers of control to address concerns about other
Washington-specific reforms that differentially affect stop rates by race,
arguably providing us with greater faith that a longer postevaluation window
will reflect responses to Arreola and not responses from unobserved
Washington-specific shocks. Accordingly, in this richer triple-differences
specification, we also show results using a longer evaluation window.
C. Difference-in-Difference Analysis: Findings
1. Preliminary Analysis: Raw Plots of Stop Rates
Before formalizing this difference-in-difference strategy in a regression
framework, we will begin by using the raw traffic-stop data and plotting
simple time trends of non-white and white stop rates over time (and
alternatively, the stop rates of Black and white drivers over time). In the spirit
of the difference-in-difference approach just discussed, this will allow us to
assess whether we indeed observe a divergence in these trend lines that
appears to begin following the Arreola decision. We will plot these trends in
monthly intervals from 2010 to 2015—that is, three years prior to and
subsequent to the December 2012 Arreola decision—using state-trooper
data from the entire state.
Simply plotting trends in the total number of stops of non-white and
white drivers may be misleading to the extent non-white and white
population counts differ. More useful will be trends that reflect the number
of stops that a given driver of each racial group is likely to experience.
Accordingly, we plot trends in the rate of traffic stops, normalizing the stop
count by the relevant population—e.g., the number of white drivers per white
population. For these purposes, we normalize by adult population counts,102
as this approximates the driving population (though, all of the results that we
present are robust to simply using the total population across all ages).

102 We acknowledge that one concern with normalizing by adult population is that the adult
population does not necessarily perfectly capture the at-risk population of more fundamental interest—
e.g., the number of people who drive by race. Nonetheless, including no normalization at all does not
strike us as a more reasonable approach than normalizing by adult population. The Online Appendix, in
any event, demonstrates the stability of our findings to these choices. See Figure A7 and accompanying
text, available at https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/vol116/iss6/2/. For instance, we
also present results with no normalization, which reinforce the conclusions that we make in this Article.
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FIGURE 1: CONCURRENT TRENDS IN NON-WHITE- AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATES, FOR
THREE YEARS PRIOR TO AND SUBSEQUENT TO ARREOLA DECISION IN WASHINGTON

FIGURE 2: CONCURRENT TRENDS IN BLACK- AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATES, FOR THREE
YEARS PRIOR TO AND SUBSEQUENT TO ARREOLA DECISION IN WASHINGTON
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We begin in Figure 1 by plotting trends over time in non-white and
white stop rates in the same graph, with the stop rate indicated on the y-axis
and the time period—characterized by months prior to and subsequent to the
Arreola decision—on the x-axis. In Figure 2, we do the same but plot
concurrent trends in the stop rates of Black drivers and white drivers.
Several observations emerge from these Figures. First, the rate of stops
of Black drivers per population exceeds that of white drivers, though the stop
rate of white drivers exceeds that of non-white drivers as a group. Second,
and most critical for this Article, it does not appear that the differential in the
non-white (or Black) rate and the white rate appears to change meaningfully
as a result of the Arreola decision. If anything, Figure 1 appears to
demonstrate a slight convergence in these trend lines after Arreola, in
contrast with the divergence predicted by the dominant theory that a Whrenlike approach to pretextual stops contributes to racial bias. If we take a closer
look at Figure 2, it does suggest a subtle divergence in Black and white stop
rates over time. However, this divergence appears to predate Arreola, casting
doubt on whether it could have been caused by Arreola.
While the Arreola decision substantively changed the legal standard
applied by courts, this preliminary observation of trends in stops by race
around this decision lends support to the countertheories set forth in Part I.
That is, the difficulty in proving pretext and weakness of the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule may indeed prevent these substantive developments
in the law from altering officers’ behavior. In the analysis to follow, we
subject this analysis and conclusion to far greater scrutiny. In short, we will
explore whether (1) Arreola truly did not alter the preexisting pattern of
racial bias in stops, as Figures 1 and 2 suggest, or (2) Arreola in fact
increased racial disparities in stop rates but other variables missing from this
preliminary analysis also affect racial disparities in stops and are masking—
i.e., working in the opposing direction—the true impacts of the change in the
law stemming from Arreola.
2. Difference-in-Difference: Overview of Regression Implementation
To assess whether other factors may indeed confound the conclusions
implied by Figures 1 and 2, we now turn to formalizing the difference-indifference strategy discussed in Section IV.B via regression analysis. There
are three key benefits of taking a regression approach over simply eyeballing
Figures 1 and 2 and assessing whether we begin to see divergence in the nonwhite and white trend lines following Arreola.
First, the parameters of interest that we will estimate in the regression
will directly produce a time trend in the differential non-white–white stop
rate. This will obviate the need to visualize and discern the difference
between the two separate lines from Figures 1 and 2 and then to see how that
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difference evolves. Rather, we can produce a single trend line—i.e., the trend
in the differential stop rate—and can simply observe if that trend line begins
to move up after Arreola. Second, by turning to a regression approach, we
are provided with a straightforward way to produce confidence intervals for
the differential in the non-white–white stop rates. This will facilitate our
ability to make statistical inferences.
Third and most importantly, by using multivariate regression, we are
able to build on our observation of Figures 1 and 2 and account for the
influence of other factors that (1) we can observe in the data, (2) may also be
changing over time, and (3) may also affect the differential in non-white and
white stop rates (or the differential in Black and white stop rates,
specifically). To be clear, the difference-in-difference structure already
flexibly accounts for factors that change over time that are common to both
Black and white drivers across the state, as we discussed above. What we are
referring to in this paragraph is the additional ability to directly account for
the influence of factors that we can specifically observe in the data and that
may happen to differentially affect stop rates across races.
For instance, one of the key controls that we will include in our
regression is the county in which the stop occurs. Figures 1 and 2 convey
that Arreola did not seem to lead to greater divergence in the stop rates of
non-white and white drivers across Washington. However, hypothetically, it
could be true that Arreola caused police officers to increase their propensity
to stop non-white relative to white drivers. Indeed, it could also be true that
around the time of the Arreola decision, the Black population in Washington
began to reside more in counties that tended to have fewer stops of drivers
overall—Black and white alike. If you combine these hypothetical
developments, you might see that on net, there is no change in the rate by
which Black drivers are stopped relative to white drivers even though in this
hypothetical, Arreola did have an effect that changed officer behavior and
intensified racial bias on any given stop. This hypothetical highlights the
benefit of controlling for the county of the stop in the regression.
Papers employing difference-in-difference techniques will often turn
from preliminary graphs of raw, uncontrolled plots of the data such as
Figures 1 and 2 above to a regression implementation of the difference-indifference approach that presents results in a simple table. This table will
often focus on presenting the estimated coefficient of an interaction
variable—i.e., the difference-in-difference coefficient—that captures how
the outcome of interest changes on average before and after the reform in
question and how that before–after change differs on average between the
treatment and control groups. In other words, difference-in-difference papers
will often collapse the entire exercise down to the reporting of a single
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parameter of interest. And in the process, by collapsing everything into a
binary before–after comparison, they lose the value that comes from a visual
observation of how the outcome of interest truly trends over time.
With our analysis, our goal will be to maintain a visual, dynamic
depiction of our results. In other words, even when we turn to our regression
implementation, we will not abandon the spirit of the above graphs and
collapse everything into a binary, before–after exercise. Rather, our goal will
be to build on these motivating graphs and modify them to (1) estimate one
trend line that directly depicts the differential in the two trend lines
previously shown and (2) adjust that trend line for the potentially
confounding influence of those factors that we want to control for in the
regression.103
Arguably, the chief advantage of maintaining this dynamic approach is
to be able to explore the pattern of results in the period prior to the reform in
question—here, Arreola. Imagine that one estimates a classic, before–after
difference-in-difference specification and derives a positive result that they
summarize in a single parameter. Does this actually signify a positive effect
of the reform? Possibly, but only under certain assumptions—i.e., that, but
for the reform, the treatment group (here, non-white drivers) and the control
group (here, white drivers) would have kept moving along parallel trends.
To shed light on the reasonableness of that assumption, scholars often at least
ensure that the treatment and control groups were moving in parallel in the
period prior to the reform. 104 A dynamic treatment of this regression
103

Technically, to estimate a dynamic regression of this nature is quite straightforward. A classic
difference-in-difference regression regresses the outcome variable on an indicator variable for being in
the POST period (i.e., after the reform), an indicator variable for being in the TREATMENT group (i.e.,
the group predicted to be impacted by the reform), an indicator variable for the interaction between being
in the POST period and the TREATMENT group, and a series of control variables. The difference-indifference estimate then comes from the estimated coefficient of that interaction term. To do this more
dynamically, instead of using a single indicator variable to capture being in the POST period, we include
a series of indicator variables for every month in our sample. We then interact all of these month indicators
(except for one that will serve as our reference month) with the indicator signifying the TREATMENT
group, which, in this case, is an indicator for being a non-white driver (or, alternatively, a Black driver).
We then plot the estimated coefficients of these interaction terms. In essence, what these interaction terms
do is allow us to observe how the stop rate for non-white drivers relative to white drivers evolves month
by month, while teasing out the influence of the included control variables. Moreover, the whole exercise
allows us to account for inherently fixed differences in stop rates between non-white and white drivers
and inherently fixed differences in stop rates across individual months.
104 For recent discussions of testing the parallel trends assumptions, see generally Alyssa Bilinski &
Laura A. Hatfield, Nothing to See Here? Non-Inferiority Approaches to Parallel Trends and Other Model
Assumptions 2 (Dec. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.03273.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C23J-27JR]; Ariella Kahn-Lang & Kevin Lang, The Promise and Pitfalls of Differences-inDifferences: Reflections on 16 and Pregnant and Other Applications, 38 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 613, 614
(2020); and Ashesh Rambachan & Jonathan Roth, An Honest Approach to Parallel Trends 5–6 (Nov. 12,
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approach affords us that opportunity. Stated more broadly, perhaps the best
way to truly assess whether Arreola appears to increase disparities is to
observe the overall time path in racial disparities in stop rates and to visualize
whether Arreola either led to a jump or an upward acceleration in the
preexisting trend in racial disparities in stop rates. Collapsing everything
down into a simple before-and-after comparison may mask important
dynamics.
By way of preview, exploring such dynamics will turn out to be hugely
important in the present context. Throughout the many alternative
specifications that we estimate below, our analysis demonstrates a strong
preexisting trend towards more stops of non-white drivers that materialized
prior to Arreola. Further, we document no robust acceleration or jump in that
preexisting trend coinciding with Arreola.
That said, while our focus will be on these dynamic graphs, there will
be one occasion on which we estimate the more classic, single-parameter
difference-in-difference approach. We acknowledge that the singleparameter approach is useful for summarizing the overall magnitude of the
treatment effect size. In our case, since the point estimates of our findings
will tend to suggest a near-zero effect of Arreola on traffic-stop rates, this
exercise will be helpful in summarizing the magnitude of the confidence
intervals of our estimates, as we discuss in greater detail below. In taking this
approach, however, we will need to modify this classic approach to account
for the preexisting differential trends in stop rates across races that we just
discussed.
Before turning to our results, we make one final technical note
regarding the functional form of our difference-in-difference approach.
Given the nature of our outcome of interest—traffic stops—we will estimate
a count model in our primary approach rather than an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) specification. 105 Primarily, we will estimate negative binomial
regressions, given the presence of overdispersion in our data. The dependent
variable will be the number of traffic stops associated with each unit of
observation. The unit of observation will vary across the different
approaches we take below (e.g., in our first approach, it will be a given
county–month–race group). Nonetheless, this approach will still allow us to

2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jroth/files/honestparalleltrends_main.
pdf [https://perma.cc/F3FN-3CEW].
105 For information regarding count models such as Poisson and negative binomial regression
models, see generally A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT
DATA 263–78 (2d ed. 2013).
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normalize by population so that we can interpret our results in terms of the
differential in the per-population rate of stops across race groups.106
Scholars employing difference-in-difference methods often face design
choices of this nature—e.g., OLS versus negative binomial—and of related
natures—e.g., should one specify the outcome variable in levels, natural
logs, or per-population rates, and so on. In the Online Appendix, we offer a
more in-depth explanation behind the functional-form choices that we make
in implementing our difference-in-difference design.107 To demonstrate the
robustness of our findings, we also present results considering a range of
permutations of these functional-form choices. For instance, we demonstrate
that the conclusions gleaned from our negative binomial results generalize
to OLS specifications that use log stop counts as the dependent variable, in
addition to Poisson specifications.
Ultimately, in all but one of the specification permutations that we
estimate, we find results similar to what we present below—i.e., we observe
a trend towards more stops of non-white drivers that long predated the 2012
change in Washington’s constitutional standards, suggesting the change in
law made no impact. The one permutation that we estimate that does produce
results suggestive of a causal impact of Arreola (with increases in the trafficstop differential that postdated Arreola) is the specification employed by
Rushin and Edwards, which (based on our reading) estimates an OLS
specification focused on stop levels (as distinct from logs) and that does not
normalize stop counts by the relevant population. 108 As we discuss in the
Online Appendix, given the substantial baseline differences in stop counts
across races, we are concerned that the functional-form approach considered
by Rushin and Edwards does not track the ultimate policy question of
interest, which is whether the Arreola reform will be associated with a
relatively greater increase in traffic stops of non-white drivers than it will of
white drivers. This point aside, our analysis at least demonstrates the
instability of that positive Arreola effect.
3. Difference-in-Difference Results: County Controls
In this first set of regression results that we present, we control for the
county in which the stop takes place in order to address the above-stated
concern over the racial composition of counties changing over time,
combined with a concern over fixed differences in traffic-stop propensities

106 In particular, we include the adult population of the relevant unit of observation as an “exposure”
variable in the regression so that we account for the inherent number of opportunities for the population
of each unit of observation to be stopped.
107 See Online Appendix at 1550–60.
108 See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, at 706.
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across counties.109 Let us begin in Figure 3 by implementing this approach
while using non-white drivers and white drivers as the racial groups of
comparison. As above, we can think of these graphs as plotting a monthly
trend in the difference between the stop rates of non-white drivers and white
drivers. The relevant difference is normalized to zero in the month prior to
Arreola, which will serve as the reference month. Positive values on the yaxis reflect a differential stop rate for the indicated month that is greater than
the differential stop rate in the reference month, and vice versa for negative
values on the y-axis.110

109

To execute this approach, we organize our data such that the unit of observation is defined as a
given county-by-month-by-racial group. The dependent variable represents the number of stops of drivers
in that county–month–race group. As above, we include the adult population count associated with that
group as an “exposure” variable so that this stop count effectively entails a per-population stop rate.
Moreover, as above, the regression will include separate indicator variables signifiying each month and
separate indicator variables signifiying each racial group, along with a set of variables capturing
interactions between each monthly indicator and the racial-group indicator. Again, to arrive at the time
trend in the differential stop rates across races—our findings of interest—we plot the coefficients of these
interaction terms. Importantly, in order to account for the concern identified over demographic swings
that differentially affect counties, we will include a series of fixed effects for each county in this regression
specification. By doing this, we can estimate the trend of interest while accounting for completely fixed
differences in stop rates across each county. More specifically, what we are doing here is ensuring that
we compare non-white and white stop rates within each county, not comparing the differential stop rates
across counties. And we are then effectively averaging this within-county-stop-rate differential over all
of the counties.
110 Moreover, the differential stop rate itself is interpreted in relative, not absolute terms—that is, in
terms of how much larger or smaller the non-white stop rate is as a fraction of the white stop rate (given
that we are estimating a negative binomial specification, whose coefficients can be interpreted as the log
change in the outcome when the relevant explanatory variable increases by 1). The graph then depicts
how this relative differential stop rate changes over time.
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FIGURE 3: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NON-WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE

The key takeaway from this graph is quite simple. In short, this Figure
does not present evidence to suggest that the Arreola decision caused a
divergence in stop rates between non-white and white drivers. To be sure, at
least when we focus on the point estimates, we do appear to observe that the
degree to which non-white drivers are stopped (per non-white adult
population) is growing relative to the degree to which white drivers are
stopped (per white adult population). However, that trend appears to have
started at the beginning of the sample period, several years prior to Arreola,
and it does not appear to have accelerated or jumped as a result of Arreola.
These findings simply do not suggest that Arreola contributed to a greater
degree of racial disparities. Rather, disparities may be growing over this time
period in Washington without a further contribution from the sanctioning of
pretextual traffic stops.
While this upward trend is apparent from the point estimates, the
standard errors around each monthly estimate are somewhat large in this
approach, in part due to the taxing nature of this estimation strategy and the
need to estimate a large number of monthly parameters given the available
data. To get more statistical power, we estimate a trend line in Figure A12
of the Online Appendix that calculates differential stop rates annually as
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opposed to monthly, thereby estimating far fewer parameters. As with the
monthly graph from Figure 3, the point estimates from this annual-interval
specification still suggest an upward trend in this differential stop rate over
the whole time horizon—even before Arreola. With somewhat tighter
confidence intervals, this annual-interval specification suggests a
statistically significant jump in the non-white-to-white differential stop rate
in the year prior to Arreola followed by increases in the differential rates
after Arreola that are nonetheless not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Again, these results are inconsistent with a story in which Arreola
contributed to an elevation in racial disparities in traffic-stop rates.
FIGURE 4: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BLACK-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE

In Figure 4, we replicate the analysis from Figure 3 but instead compare
trends in the stop rates of Black and white drivers. As with Figure 3, we also
show a counterpart in the Online Appendix (Figure A13) that produces this
trend in annual intervals. Before Arreola, it looks as if the Black–white stop
rate is trending downwards, and after Arreola, it looks like this differential
rate is trending upwards. This pattern might indeed be suggestive of an effect
of Arreola that increases the differential in traffic-stop rates between Black
and white drivers. However, one key aspect of Figure 4 cuts against this
interpretation. Over 2012—in the months leading up to the Arreola
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decision—the Black–white stop differential is increasing (with the exception
of the month before Arreola). As such, it could be that the trend towards
more stops of Black drivers in the post-Arreola period is reflective of some
phenomenon that predated Arreola and that was thus not caused by Arreola.
In any event, in our attempts to account for other variables that are changing
over time and that may also impact the Black-to-white stop-rate differential,
the analysis that we set forth below will demonstrate that this initial
observation of declining Black–white stop rates over the pre-Arreola period
followed by increasing Black–white stop rates in the post-Arreola period
does not hold up to further scrutiny. The analysis to follow suggests that the
Black–white trend is similar to the non-white-to-white trend, with both
generally increasing over the whole sample period, as opposed to in the postArreola period only.
4. Null Effects Versus Zero Effects
While the above graphs do not suggest that Arreola affected racial bias
in traffic stops, this does not necessarily mean that the true effect of Arreola
on racial disparities in stops is zero. Our estimates are just that—estimates.
As with all estimates, they are subject to some degree of statistical noise.
Accordingly, a more accurate description of our findings is that we identify
a range of possible effects of Arreola on the differential in stops between
non-white and white drivers, where this range is centered around zero. But
we acknowledge there is some probability of a positive impact of Arreola on
racial bias in stops. Consistent with best practices when presenting null
effects, we will at least attempt to explain the magnitude of Arreola effect
sizes that we can rule out with statistical confidence.
In doing so, this will be the one instance in which we will move away
from presenting rich, dynamic graphs and try to characterize our findings in
a single parameter. For these purposes, we collapse our findings down to a
classic difference-in-difference estimate, whereby we simply estimate the
average stop rate for non-white drivers relative to white drivers after Arreola
relative to before Arreola. We can make this comparison by regressing the
stop rate on an indicator for the non-white-driver group, an indicator for the
post-Arreola period, and an interaction between these two indicators.
To be sure, when we estimate that classic difference-in-difference
regression, we find a positive coefficient for the interaction term, specifically
a roughly 5% increase in the relative non-white-to-white stop rate after
Arreola. However, as Figure 3 shows, that positive effect is likely reflective
of a seemingly linear upwards trend in the differential stop rate that predated
Arreola. It is not likely caused by Arreola. The shape of Figure 3 suggests
that the traditional difference-in-difference specification should be modified
to account for race-specific linear trends in stop rates that transpire over the
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full sample period. When we include such trends in the regression, the
question that we ask effectively becomes: how does the stop rate for nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers increase in the post-Arreola period,
where the non-white and white stop rates are each measured relative to the
preexisting linear trends in such rates over time? This ensures that we would
not falsely attribute a general trend towards relatively more non-white stops
over time as being due to Arreola. Now, if Arreola happened to result in a
one-time increase in stop rates for non-white drivers relative to white drivers,
or if it happened to intensify the degree of the preexisting trend towards nonwhite stops, then this modified specification would capture such an effect.
Of course, a simple observation of Figure 3 already suggests neither an
upwards bend in the differential trend line that occurs at the Arreola decision
nor a one-time jump in differential stop rates. Accordingly, based on Figure
3, one would expect that estimating a simple before-versus-after differencein-difference model that fits race-specific linear trends would produce an
effect of Arreola that is close to zero.111 And in fact, this is exactly what we
find. Specifically, as demonstrated by Column 1 of Table 2, this approach
produces a point estimate for the Arreola effect of 0.006. This can effectively
be interpreted as a 0.006 fractional change (or a 0.6% change) relative to the
mean per-population stop rate in the data of 0.0128—i.e., this point estimate
suggests that Arreola increased the gap between non-white and white stops
by a magnitude of about 8 stops per 100,000 people (0.6% of 0.0128).112
Critically, this magnitude is both very small in and of itself and statistically
indistinguishable from zero. In other words, we cannot say with statistical
confidence that Arreola had any effect on stop rates. Even though this null
effect is perhaps to be expected from the results presented in Figure 3, the
advantage of the single-parameter approach is to help quantify the breadth
of the possible effect size implied by our findings.
On this latter point, we find that the 95% confidence interval for the
difference-in-difference coefficient estimated in Table 2 spans from (1) a
111
Specifically, we add to the basic difference-in-difference regression a linear trend term and an
interaction between the linear trend and the non-white driver group. This specification will allow us to
estimate the difference-in-difference effect while allowing for unobservable factors that drive a difference
between the non-white and white stop rates and that evolve at a fixed, linear rate over the whole sample
period. Scholars have characterized a modification of this nature as essentially identifying the reform
effect under a “parallel trends-in-trends” assumption. See, e.g., Naoki Egami & Soichiro Yamauchi, Using
Multiple Pre-Treatment Periods to Improve Difference-in-Differences and Staggered Adoption Designs
12–13 (Sept. 15, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://soichiroy.github.io/files/papers/double_did.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZV2-SPEB] (explaining and illustrating the use of this linear term for modeling under
the “parallel trends-in-trends” assumption).
112 Again, the negative binomial coefficient signifies the log change of the relevant variable, which
can be interpreted as a percent change. See Matthew A. Andersen, Calculating and Interpreting
Percentage Changes for Economic Analysis, 1 APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RES. 25, 26 (2019).
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decline in the differential non-white-to-white stop rate of a magnitude equal
to 5% of the mean per-population stop rate—i.e., about 6 stops per 10,000
people—to (2) an increase in the differential non-white-to-white stop rate of
a magnitude equal to 6% of the mean per-population stop rate—i.e., about 8
stops per 10,000 people.113 To be clear, the point estimate discussed in the
preceding paragraph—which implied an increase in the stop-rate difference
of a magnitude of around 8 stops per 100,000 people—is notably closer to
zero than these bounds and represents what we would expect to find from the
Arreola decision. These bounds represent remote possibilities. What is
helpful about this demonstration, however, is to illustrate that even the
remote possibilites represented by the bounds of the confidence intervals are
still relatively minor in degree.
Notably, the point estimate of the Arreola effect on racial disparities in
stops from Rushin and Edwards—which suggests an increase in the nonwhite-to-white stop rate of over 10% of the mean stop count—falls beyond
the confidence bounds of our analysis. In other words, not only does the point
estimate from our study fall substantially closer to zero relative to that of
Rushin and Edwards’s study, but our analysis can also reject with statistical
confidence that the effect of Arreola is as large as that reported in their study.
In Column 2 of Table 2, we extend this bounding analysis to our review
of Black versus white stops. The conclusion reached here is much the same,
with small point estimates that are indistinguishuable from zero and bounds
of the 95% confidence interval reflecting remote possibilities that are
themselves somewhat modest in size. 114 Unfortunately, since Professors
Rushin and Edwards did not estimate the effects of Arreola on the
differential in stops of Black versus white drivers, we cannot situate their
analysis within our confidence bounds.

113 As discussed in note 103, supra, we acknowledge that estimating confidence intervals is arguably
problematic given that we are only drawing on one treatment state. In future work, we hope to draw from
the experiences around 2012 in a number of control states to build a confidence interval through an
approach similar to that proposed by Conley & Taber, supra note 98. This point does not necessarily
undermine our conclusion that we fail to find evidence suggestive of an increase in racial disparities in
stop rates following Arreola; however, future work in improving upon our standard-error estimates may
improve our ability to infer that the effect is indeed small at best.
114 We find even tighter confidence intervals with the exercise undertaken in Table 2 when we
include controls for driver race and sex. For instance, in the Black-versus-white stop comparison, we find
that the upper bounds of the confidence interval suggest an increase in the Black–white stop-rate gap that
is only 4% of the mean stop rate (or an increase representing only 5 out of 10,000 drivers).
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TABLE 2: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ESTIMATES OF EFFECT OF ARREOLA ON DIFFERENTIAL RATES OF
TRAFFIC STOPS BETWEEN NON-WHITE (OR BLACK) AND WHITE DRIVERS (INCLUDING RACESPECIFIC LINEAR TRENDS)
Column 1
Column 2
After Arreola
–0.052 (0.038)
–0.065* (0.034)
–0.283*** (0.079)
Non-White Driver
Black Driver
0.073*** (0.104)
After Arreola x Non0.006 (0.027)
White Driver
After Arreola x Black
0.027 (0.031)
Driver
N
5,472
5,460
95% Confidence Interval
[–0.046, 0.059]
[–0.034, 0.087]
for Estimated Differencein-Difference Coefficient
Note. * indicates statistical significance at 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at 5%;
*** indicates statistical significance at 1%.

5. Missing Race Data
A critical challenge facing this exercise is posed by the fact that roughly
27% of the records in the Washington State Trooper database do not indicate
a race of the driver (whereas approximately 57% of the records indicate a
white driver, 3.5% a Black driver, 7% a Hispanic driver, 4.6% an Asian or
Pacific Islander driver, and 1% a driver of other race). For those traffic stops
in which race is not identified, none of the driver demographics are
identified—that is, for roughly 27% of the stops, there is simply no record of
the driver’s age, sex, or race.115
In one of their key analyses, Professors Rushin and Edwards assume
that all of those with missing race fields are stops for non-white drivers—
i.e., they assign as “non-white” all those drivers with race missing.116 They
premise this assumption on the idea that officers may not be recording race
to conceal their racial bias in stops. 117 That assumption, however, seems
inconsistent with the observation just made that stops with missing race
codes provide no demographic information at all. Below, we will set forth
an additional empirical marker that questions the reasonableness of this
assumption. Nonetheless, alternatively, Rushin and Edwards demonstrate
that the findings they present are robust to simply dropping observations with
115 More specifically, among those without race, 99.95% of those stops do not report driver age and
99.9% do not report the sex of the driver. See Data, supra note 93.
116 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, at 669.
117 Id.
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missing race, an approach that we find preferrable to their other approach
and one of those that we take in our own analysis. Overall, our investigation
into this issue builds on Rushin and Edwards’s work and will take several
approaches in attempting to ascertain whether the presence of stops with
missing race biases us against finding evidence of a true effect of Arreola.
At the beginning of this important discussion over missing race codes,
let us clarify what we have already done in Figures 3 and 4 to begin to
address this problem. When estimating the regressions underlying these
Figures, we have taken one of the common empirical approaches 118 to
address missing data and have provided for a third race group in our data
structure—non-white, white, and missing-race—while also including an
indicator variable in the regression for this missing-race group, along with a
set of interactions between this missing-race indicator and each sample
month.119 With this approach, we are controlling for how the trends in the
differences in non-white to white stops that we observe within counties—
our key parameters of interest—may correlate with the time trends in stop
rates among drivers with missing race that we also observe. That is,
hypothetically, if the data tend to show that non-white stops fall relative to
white stops when we also happen to see growth in the number of stops with
missing race codes, then this regression approach can control for such an
effect. We note, however, that the results turn out to be almost identical if
we do not include these missing-race controls and simply drop those stops
with missing race codes entirely from the analysis.
In the remainder of this Section, we nonetheless acknowledge the
possibility that this missing-race-control approach may not sufficiently
account for a bias that may result from missing race codes. Accordingly, we
now turn to setting forth various empirical markers designed to diagnose
whether we should indeed be concerned with such a bias.
To begin this discussion, recall that, thus far, our results have failed to
produce evidence to suggest that Arreola contributed to an increase in racial
bias in traffic stops. Might a positive effect of Arreola nonetheless exist?
And might so many observations with missing race data prevent us from
finding this positive effect? At the outset of thinking about this question, we
of course acknowledge that if we could assign a race field to those with

118 See, e.g., Jason Abrevaya & Stephen G. Donald, A GMM Approach for Dealing with Missing
Data on Regressors, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 657, 657 (2017) (describing the inclusion of an additional
dummy variable to indicate when data are missing).
119 Recall that the data are organized at the county-by-month-by-race-group level. Here, we simply
allow for a missing-race group within this structure. For the purposes of structuring our exposure variable,
the population that we assign to the missing-race group is the total population for the relevant county–
month.
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missing race data, we could achieve even better precision in our analysis and
even further tighten the confidence intervals discussed previously. But of
greater relevance to our present inquiry is not precision but whether we
should have reason to be concerned that our previous analysis has been
biased by not having this information—and biased in a way that may be
masking a true Arreola effect.
We can envision two scenarios in which missing race may be imposing
such a bias. First, it could be that non-white drivers are inherently more likely
to have a missing race code than white drivers. In other words, out of the
group of approximately 27% of stops with missing race codes, more of them
may in fact be non-white rather than white relative to the 73% of stops in
which we can observe race codes. This fact alone actually would not be
problematic; however, if one combined this fact with an increase in the rate
of stops with missing race codes in the post-Arreola period, it could be true
that we are not capturing all of the increase in non-white stops relative to
white stops that is occuring after Arreola.
Alternatively, it could be that the overall mix of non-white and white
drivers among the 27% of stops with missing race codes equals the mix of
non-white and white drivers in the 73% of stops in which we can observe
race (over all sample years). Even if that is the case, a problem could still be
posed by the possibility that the proportion of non-white drivers among the
group of drivers with missing race codes is higher in the post-Arreola period
relative to the pre-Arreola period. A hypothetical scenario of that nature
could also account for an increase in the number of stops of non-white drivers
relative to white drivers after Arreola relative to before that we are not
accounting for.
In the analysis to follow, we will take several steps to confront this
question and to assess whether these two scenarios may in fact be
confounding the conclusions suggested by the above Sections.
To begin, consider the first scenario just raised. There are two
components to this concern: (1) that the missing-race group has a higher
percentage of non-white drivers than the group for which race can be
observed and (2) that we see a trend towards more stops with missing race
that begins after Arreola. Let us take these in turn. First, it is ostensibly
unknowable whether the missing-race group is relatively more non-white
than the group with observable race. However, we can at least look at other
characteristics of traffic stops that we can observe—e.g., the location of the
stop (which is relatively fine-grained with roughly 7,500 specific locations
recorded throughout the state in the data), the time of day of the stop, and the
sex and race of the officer—and use them to predict a likelihood of the driver
being non-white for all stops that have values for these other characteristics,
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whether or not they have values for the driver’s race.120 By drawing on other
stop characteristics to form driver-race predictions, we find only a very
slightly higher likelihood of being non-white among the missing-race group
(with a predicted likelihood of being non-white equal to 30.26%) compared
with the observable race group (29.64%).121 This difference alone may be
minor enough not to worry about this scenario in the first place, but again
even if this difference were larger, it would only be a concern if we also saw
a growth in missing-race stops that emerged in the post-Arreola period. Do
we find this?
In Figure A2 of the Online Appendix, we set forth a monthly trend in
the across-county average number of stops with missing race. From two
years before and after Arreola, there is no apparent trend in the number of
stops with missing race, just monthly noise. There is a notable jump up in
the number of stops with missing race codes in the period of time after two
years post-Arreola. One might be concerned that Arreola has a lagged impact
on the number of stops of non-white drivers and this increase in the count of
stops with missing race at the end of this sample is preventing us from
observing this effect. However, this observation is not limited to only the
post-Arreola period, cutting against the possibility that this increase in
missing stops coincides with Arreola itself. That is, we also observe that in
the period of time before two years pre-Arreola, we see sharp increases in
the counts of stops with missing race. As such, if non-white drivers indeed
have relatively more missing-race events recorded than white drivers, any
correction that we would make for this given the trend in missing-race counts
that we observe would produce an increase in non-white stops relative to
white stops over the whole sample period—before and after Arreola. In other
words, even if non-white drivers are relatively more likely to be
overrepresented in the missing-race data and we tried to correct for that, we
120

Specifically, to form these predictions, we consider the sample of stops with information on driver
race and the other variables of interest—e.g., stop location—and estimate a probit model of the incidence
of the stop being associated with a non-white driver (or Black driver, alternatively) on variables indicating
these other characteristics of the stop. We then form predicted values of driver race based on the
coefficients from this probit specification, but we form these predictions over the whole sample—at least
the whole sample that has information on the predictive variables. The predicted values from this
specification allow us to form a prediction of the likelihood that the stop is of a non-white driver based
on the observable values for these various characteristics. Addressing the problem of missing data through
imputation exercises of this nature—i.e., estimating missing values based on other available data—is a
common approach taken in empirical analyses to confront missing data. See, e.g., Abrevaya & Donald,
supra note 118, at 657 (describing “imputation,” a method that involves estimating missing data using
other available data).
121 This finding further cautions against the primary approach taken by Rushin and Edwards of
assuming that all stops with missing race fields are for non-white drivers and lends support to the
secondary approach that Rushin and Edwards take, which drops observations with missing race. Rushin
& Edwards, supra note 21, at 669.
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would likely just reinforce the conclusions reached above—that stops of nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers are increasing over the whole sample
period and do not appear to be caused by Arreola.
Let us now move on to assess the second scenario posed above—i.e.,
the possibility that, whatever the overall share of non-white to white drivers
is among the missing-race stops, the composition of this missing-race group
is nonetheless trending towards relatively more non-white (or Black) drivers
relative to white drivers in the post-Arreola period. We attempt to shed light
on this possibility through a straightforward imputation exercise. In short,
we will use other available information from the stop—as above—to form
the predicted likelihood that the stop involved a non-white driver.122 For the
purposes of tractability, we then move beyond just predicting the likelihood
of being non-white but also predict in a binary sense which of these missingrace stops are for non-white drivers and which are for white drivers. By
forming predicted race assignments in this binary sense, we will afford
ourselves a straightforward means of comparing—via graphs similar to those
already presented—the counts of stops between the group of drivers with
missing race codes that are predicted to be non-white and the group of drivers
with missing race codes that are predicted to be white.123 If this trend happens
to demonstrate an increase in this particular differential that coincides with
Arreola, it would implicate a concern that the missing-race data are biasing
our analysis against observing a true positive impact of Arreola.
In Figure 5, we present results from this exercise, demonstrating the
monthly trend in the differential stop rate for drivers predicted to be nonwhite relative to drivers predicted to be white among those stops with
missing race codes. This trend is flat over the whole sample period, easing
concerns that missing race data may be precluding us from documenting the
positive effects of Arreola predicted by the dominant theory. In Figure 6, we
repeat this exercise for drivers with predicted-Black race and predicted-white
race among the set of stops with missing race codes. Again, we find no
122

See supra note 120 for information on this prediction exercise.
To be able to form these binary assignments, however, we need to make a normalization
assumption—though it is an assumption that we have already made when describing this scenario. That
is, we assume that the overall percentage of non-white drivers among the group of drivers with missing
race codes is the same as the percentage of non-white drivers among the group of drivers with observable
races. With our predicted likelihoods of being non-white, we can then order all of the missing-race drivers
in order of these likelihoods and assign them into the non-white group in the order of this likelihood until
this overall assumed percentage is met. To reiterate, this is simply a normalization exercise. Whatever the
overall percentage of non-white drivers among the missing group happens to be, the purpose of this
exercise is just to see how the composition of this group is trending over time—i.e., to see if the group of
missing-race stops is trending (in a way that coincides with Arreola) towards more stops with
characteristics that would lead one to predict they are likely associated with non-white drivers. On a final
note, we performed all of these prediction exercises on a county-specific basis.
123
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markers that suggest an increase in stops of predicted-Black drivers relative
to predicted-white drivers among this missing-race group coinciding with
Arreola, which would have raised concerns that we are biased away from
finding an Arreola effect.
FIGURE 5: TREND IN DIFFERENTIAL STOP RATE OF PREDICTED-NON-WHITE DRIVERS AND
PREDICTED-WHITE DRIVERS AMONG STOPS WITH MISSING RACE CODES
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FIGURE 6: TREND IN DIFFERENTIAL STOP RATE OF PREDICTED-BLACK DRIVERS AND
PREDICTED-WHITE DRIVERS AMONG STOPS WITH MISSING RACE CODES

6. Other Control Variables
Thus far, we have shown that there does not appear to be an increase in
the rate of non-white-to-white (or Black-to-white) stops that arises in the
post-Arreola period. So far, we have controlled for the county of the stop and
for fixed differences in stop rates across months and across races. However,
it is possible that some other characteristics of the underlying non-white (or
Black) population are also changing over time in a way that could confound
this analysis and mask a true effect of Arreola. For instance, hypothetically,
one may be concerned that the population of non-white drivers is becoming
relatively older post-Arreola. This may be concerning if older drivers are
stopped at lower rates. That is, it could be that Arreola in fact increased the
propensity to pull over a given non-white driver, but it is hard to observe that
outcome based on our results thus far since we are hypothetically also
observing a shift towards older non-white drivers.
Fortuately, we can address this concern—and a related concern based
on the recorded sex of the driver—given that we also observe these two
characteristics within the Washington State Trooper database. In Figures 7
and 8, we replicate Figures 3 and 4 from above but now estimate the
differential trend in the rate of stops of non-white relative to white drivers
(and, alternatively, Black relative to white drivers), but do so while
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controlling in the underlying regression for the recorded age and sex of the
driver.124
FIGURE 7: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NON-WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE,
INCLUDING CONTROLS FOR DRIVER AGE AND SEX

124 Specifically, to achieve this, we arrange the data at the county–month–race-group–age-group–
sex-group level (e.g., there would be a unit of observation for non-white males aged twenty to twentyfour in King County in January 2013). We then estimate the same specification mentioned above, but we
also include control variables for the different age and sex groups. Necessary for this approach is also
population data at this level of aggregation, which we obtain from the American Community Survey
(available at https://data.census.gov/mdat/#/ [https://perma.cc/5534-N4CB]). In this sense, we are
determining these differential trends between non-white and white drivers within different demographic
groups and then effectively averaging over all such demographic groups. In this way, we ensure that
differences in stop propensities across age groups or across sexes are not contributing to our findings.
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FIGURE 8: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRAFFIC-STOP RATES OF BLACK AND WHITE DRIVERS, INCLUDING
CONTROLS FOR DRIVER AGE AND SEX

The results continue to dispel any notion that Arreola causally
contributed to a rise in non-white stops. If anything, as before, we simply see
a general trend over time towards more non-white stops, with the Arreola
decision having no apparent impact on that trajectory. This appears to be the
case both when comparing non-white and white driver trends and Black and
white driver trends.
In Figures A9 and A10 of the Online Appendix, we take this controls
analysis one step further and organize the data at the county–month–driverrace–driver-age–driver-sex–officer-age–officer-sex level, allowing us then
to ensure that we compare the rate of stops of non-white and white drivers
within officer race and sex groups. This addresses potential concerns that the
trends presented thus far may be confounded, for instance, by changes in the
racial composition of the officer workforce over time, which is concerning
to the extent that officers may differ across race in the degree of their racial
bias in initiating stops. We continue to estimate similar patterns in the data
by incrementally adding officer controls of this nature.
D. Triple-Differences Analysis: Night-Versus-Day Variation
Even after controlling for the possibility of demographic shifts in the
county of residence and in the age and sex of drivers, as we have done above,
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one may still be concerned with yet other characteristics of drivers changing
differentially for white and non-white drivers in the post-Arreola period.
That is, it could still be the case that Arreola led to an increase in the nonwhite-to-white stop differential, but we are unable to discern it due to some
shock that we cannot observe and thus cannot control for.
In this Section, we will consider another quasi-experimental strategy to
address this concern. Drawing on other studies in racial bias in traffic
stops,125 we start with the prediction that officers exhibiting racial bias in
traffic stops will be able to act on such biases during the daytime, but not
during nighttime hours (or at least not as effectively during nighttime hours).
This prediction motivates adding another layer of control—i.e., another layer
of differentiation—to the strategy that we have employed above. Thus far,
our analysis has stemmed from the idea that if Arreola affected stops, we
would see such an effect on non-white drivers in the post-Arreola period.
This, in turn, motivated us to use white drivers as one layer of control and to
use the pre-Arreola period as another layer of control. A “veil-of-darkness”
prediction allows us to add yet another dimension to the analysis and use
nighttime stops as a third layer of control.
In essence, we will build on the difference-in-difference strategy from
above to estimate a “triple-differences” specification. In this approach, we
will estimate the difference between day and night in the difference-indifference calculation from above. If Arreola is expected to increase stops
for non-white relative to white drivers, and if one would expect this effect to
be larger during daylight hours, then one would expect a positive tripledifferences finding (when viewing nighttime as the control).
This veil-of-darkness methodology effectively leaves us with a withinrace treatment and control group. Why is that especially valuable? Consider
a hypothetical threat to the analysis thus far: We may have not observed an
expansion in the non-white-to-white stop rate after Arreola because the nonwhite population experienced a negative income shock in the post-Arreola
period that left them relatively less able to buy a car. Our close-to-zero point
estimates from Table 2 could perhaps be explained by a combination of a
true increase in racial bias resulting from Arreola that is nonetheless offset
in the aggregate by this hypothetical negative income shock to the non-white
125 See, e.g., William C. Horrace & Shawn M. Rohlin, How Dark Is Dark? Bright Lights, Big City,
Racial Profiling, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 226, 227 (2016) (introducing potential applications of a veilof-darkness methodology); Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic
Stops from Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 878, 878 (2006) (outlining a new
methodology “that does not require explicit external estimates of the race distribution of the population
at risk of being stopped”); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, at 643–45 (explaining the empirical
application of the triple-differences framework and its implications for contemporary understanding of
why police officers initiate traffic stops).

1532

116:1481 (2022)

Are Constitutional Rights Enough?

population. But, this income shock would be expected to lower the non-white
stop rate both at night and during the day. By taking our estimated time trend
in the non-white-to-white stop rate and further differencing that trend
between night and day—i.e., via a triple-differences estimate—we would
effectively take our difference-in-difference finding from above and cleanse
it of unobservable shocks of this hypothetical nature. That is, we can identify
the effect of Arreola even while accounting for the possibility that something
we cannot observe is driving up or driving down the stop rate of non-white
drivers in the period following Arreola. This is the power of the tripledifferences strategy.
In executing this strategy, we continue to avoid collapsing the inquiry
into a simple before–after analysis—i.e., we avoid estimating just a single
triple-differences parameter. We again want to take a more dynamic
approach and track these differences over incremental time periods leading
up to and following Arreola. However, given that our specification is a bit
more intricate now and involves a notably greater number of parameters to
estimate, we present these triple-differences results using annual increments
rather than monthly increments.126 So, year by year between 2010 and 2015,
we show how the differential stop rate between non-white and white
drivers—itself differentiated between day and night—trends. If Arreola
caused an increase in stop rates for non-white drivers, we would expect to
observe a positive value of this double-differential emerge in the 2013–2015
period, which is the post-Arreola period. We present results for this exercise
in the next two graphs, first comparing non-white and white drivers and then
comparing Black and white drivers.

126 The conclusions we reach, however, are robust to using a monthly approach. To formalize this
dynamic triple-differences estimation, we regress the number of stops on a series of triple-interaction
terms—i.e., an indicator for non-white drivers interacted with an indicator for daytime hours interacted
with an indicator for 2010, and so on for each sample year, leaving out the year leading up to Arreola to
serve as a reference year. The regression specification also includes all constitutive terms of these
interactions—i.e., all relevant double-interaction terms along with the indicator variables for each month,
for daytime hours and for non-white drivers. Naturally, to pull off this specification, we organized these
data at the county-by-year-by-race-group-by-day–night level. For the exposure variable, we continue to
use the relevant year–month–race population count and do not use a separate exposure variable for day
versus night (as we have no natural candidate for such purposes). We also confirm that our results are
essentially identical when we do not include an exposure variable. The general triple-differences
methodology is motivated by Jonathan Gruber. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated
Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622, 627 (1994).
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FIGURE 9: DYNAMIC TRIPLE-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED ANNUAL TREND IN
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NON-WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP
RATE DURING THE DAY VERSUS AT NIGHT

FIGURE 10: DYNAMIC TRIPLE-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED ANNUAL TREND
IN DIFFERENCE IN TRAFFIC-STOP RATE BETWEEN BLACK DRIVERS AND WHITE
DRIVERS DURING THE DAY VERSUS AT NIGHT
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With respect to Figure 9, showing non-white versus white stop-rate
trends (day versus night), we do see higher average rates after 2012 than
before. However, the double-interaction effects—non-white versus white,
further differenced by day versus night—had already been trending upwards
prior to Arreola. As can be observed, the estimated coefficient for 2010 is
statistically distinguishable from its 2012 level, demonstrating a statistically
significant and large pre-Arreola trend. As such, this graph is inconsistent
with a story in which Arreola—i.e., the relaxation in the prohibition of
pretextual stops—caused officers to increase racial bias in traffic stops, as
the dominant theory predicts. If anything, the fact that this increasing pretrend appeared to flatten out after Arreola suggests an effect in the other
direction.
As mentioned above, we are inclined to focus on a three-year
observation window in our preliminary difference-in-difference approaches
given that we possess only one treatment state in this natural experiment and
given concerns over unobservable Washington-specific shocks that may
inevitably arise at some point in the future. But we do consider longer
postreform observation windows in instances in which we use more
advanced approaches designed to address such unobservable shocks. This
day–night triple-differences approach is one of those instances. Accordingly,
in Figures A16 and A17 of the Online Appendix, we present counterparts to
Figures 9 and 10 that extend this window by three additional years—i.e.,
through 2018. This expanded window does not alter the conclusions we
reached above. We do observe a sharp increase in the non-white-to-white
differential stop rate in 2016, but this spike is not long-lived and systematic,
with the differential returning to close to zero in 2017 and 2018. And we
actually observe a decline in the Black–white differential stop rate in 2017
and 2018. Altogether, there is no evidence that Arreola led to delayed
worsening of racial bias in traffic stops.
To conclude, we reiterate that the veil-of-darkness method is designed
to alleviate concerns over unobservable race-specific shocks that would
affect traffic stops during the day and night alike—e.g., it can account for the
income shock hypothesized above. But what if there are reforms that were
passed around the time of the Arreola decision that may also affect an
officer’s racial bias in initiating traffic stops? This veil-of-darkness
methodology would simply not allow us to separate an Arreola effect from
the effect of these other reforms. Why? Because if these other reforms
hypothetically affect an officer’s racial bias, they too will ostensibly have a
stronger effect during the day than during the night.
We emphasize this point as there is one reform of special concern
here—i.e., Washington’s legalization of recreational marijuana that became
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effective in the same exact month that the Arreola decision came down.127
Professors Rushin and Edwards motivated their day-versus-night tripledifferences approach apparently in part as a means of separating an Arreola
effect from a marijuana legalization effect. 128 However, per the point just
made, if marijuana legalization resulted in a change in racial bias in the
decision to pull over a driver, simply comparing stops in the day versus the
night would not isolate the effects of marijuana legalization from those of
Arreola. After all, both reforms could impact an officer’s bias in the stop
decision, leading to a prediction of a stronger effect in the day over the night
for both reforms. Accordingly, we now turn to a novel approach not yet
considered in the literature that may also allow us to confront this particular
challenge and to help disentangle the effects of marijuana legalization from
the effects of a change in substantive constitutional standards bearing on
pretextual stops.
E. Triple-Differences Analysis: Washington Versus Colorado
As just stated, if the legalization of recreational marijuana affected
officers’ racial motivations in initiating a traffic stop, the contemporaneous
developments of Arreola and marijuana legalization will naturally leave it
difficult to disentangle the effects of these separate developments, even when
employing the day-versus-night differentiation. But why might one expect
marijuana legalization to also affect an officer’s bias? We can envision a few
possible stories.
For instance, marijuana legalization could leave officers more inclined
to stop non-white relative to white drivers to the extent that legalizing
marijuana created an increased scope for stops based on driving while under
the influence of marijuana129 and to the extent that officers perceived nonwhite drivers as more likely to commit this offense. On the other hand,
legalizing marijuana reduces one basis for initiating a stop—i.e., to search
for marijuana in the car. To the extent stops of that nature were racially
biased, legalizing marijuana could theoretically reduce the scope on the
margin for racial bias in initiating traffic stops.130 This latter possibility is
particularly concerning because it could mean that Arreola may have
127

See Aaron Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington, CNN (Nov. 8,
2012, 11:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/marijuana-legalization-washingtoncolorado/ [https://perma.cc/4MYJ-4GX3]; Nathaniel Counts, Initiative 502 and Conflicting State and
Federal Law, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2013–2014).
128 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, at 683, 690–91.
129 See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502(1)(b), (5)–(6) (2022).
130 Pierson et al., supra note 17, at 736, did show that the racial gap in searches was reduced after
marijuana legalization. However, that finding was focused on searches and not initial stop decisions,
which are the focus of this Article.
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exacerbated racial bias in traffic stops, but we simply cannot observe that
marginal effect because it was washed away by a countervailing negative
effect of legalizing marijuana.
Fortunately, we are able to take steps to confront this concern by
comparing the experiences in Washington with the experiences in Colorado,
a state that legalized recreational marijuana use with an effective date for that
legal change only days away from the corresponding effective date in the
state of Washington (a date that again was in the same month as the Arreola
decision).131 In essence, in order to address the concern just raised, we can
look to the experiences of Colorado around this time and see how the nonwhite to white stop differential changed in Colorado before and after 2013.
In Figures 11 and 12, we show results of this nature, effectively replicating
the Washington analysis from Figures 3 and 4 but using Colorado data.
FIGURE 11: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED
TREND IN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NON-WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE AND
WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE IN COLORADO

131 Amendment 64 to the Colorado constitution, ratified on November 6, was proclaimed into the
Colorado constitution on December 10, 2012. Marijuana Enforcement Division, Permanent Rules Related
to the Colorado Retail Marijuana Code, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE (Sept. 9, 2013),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Retail%20Marijuana%20Rules,%20Adopted%2009
0913,%20Effective%20101513%5B1%5D_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEB7-TFXT].
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FIGURE 12: DYNAMIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN
DIFFERENCE IN TRAFFIC-STOP RATE BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE DRIVERS IN COLORADO

Interestingly, this Colorado analysis suggests, if anything, that
legailizing marijuana may have halted a preexisting downward trend in nonwhite stops relative to white stops (and in Black relative to white stops). In
other words, marijuana legalization may have increased racial bias in traffic
stops. Again, our concern with the Washington analysis was that perhaps
marijuana legalization decreased racial bias, which is why we could not
detect an increase in bias after Arreola (as predicted by the dominant
theory). But that concern does not seem to bear out according to Figures 11
and 12.
To elaborate, let us assume that the Colorado marijuana legalization
experience can inform on the marginal effects of legalizing marijuana in
Washington, an assumption aided by the fact that the marijuana legalization
occurred nearly contemporaneously in both states. Proceeding with this
assumption, if we were to net out the marijauana effect implied by the
experiences in Colorado (see Figures 11 and 12) from the pre-post-Arreola
effects in Washington, one might conclude that the non-white-to-white
differential in Washington in the post-Arreola period should be even smaller
than that depicted in Figures 3 and 4 above. This only further cuts against
any inference that Arreola led to an increase in the rate of non-white relative
to white stops.
We next formalize this comparison of the experiences of Washington
and Colorado before and after the end of 2012 by estimating a triple1538
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differences specification. The goal with this strategy is again to estimate the
effect of Arreola on racial bias in traffic stops while netting out the influence
of legalizing marijuana on racial disparities in stops. Methodologically, this
approach is similar to the veil-of-darkness approach,132 except that instead of
using day versus night as the third dimension of differentiaton, we compare
stop rates in Washinton and Colorado. The key assumption of this approach,
of course, is that marijuana legalization will impact Colorado and
Washington in the same manner, at least as it relates to racial bias in traffic
stops.133 As with the day-versus-night approach, we will again use annual as
opposed to monthly increments for this analysis, given the much greater
number of parameters involved in the estimation.
FIGURE 13: DYNAMIC TRIPLE-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN NON-WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE AND WHITE-TRAFFIC-STOP RATE IN
WASHINGTON RELATIVE TO COLORADO

In Figures 13 and 14, we present the triple-differences results in a
dynamic graph (with Figure 13 focusing on the non-white-to-white
comparison and Figure 14 the Black–white comparison). Consider first
Figure 13. With this graph, we can see how the rate of stops of non-white
drivers relative to white drivers in Washington relative to Colorado evolves

132

See supra Section IV.D.
Stated differently, this approach assumes that other than Arreola, any race-specific shocks to stop
rates that may hit in the post-Arreola period will affect Colorado and Washington alike (in percent terms).
133
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year by year. If Arreola increased racial bias, we would expect to see a jump
in this double-differenced measure after Arreola—i.e., after the end of 2012.
As is evident from Figure 13, however, we do not see such an increase.
Rather, prior to Arreola, there is already a statistically significant preexisting
trend towards greater non-white-to-white stop rates in Washington relative
to Colorado. If Arreola contributed further to racial bias in stops, we would
expect that trend to tilt even more upwards or to jump to a new level. Instead,
the trend turns downwards slightly (which is arguably consistent with the
implications of the trend break suggested by Figure 11).
FIGURE 14: DYNAMIC TRIPLE-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS: ESTIMATED TREND IN
DIFFERENCE IN TRAFFIC-STOP RATE BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE
DRIVERS IN WASHINGTON RELATIVE TO COLORADO

The results from the Black-to-white stop-rate analysis from Figure 14
show less evidence of a preexisting trend over the whole pre-Arreola period,
though we do observe a large jump from 2011 to 2012. As such, even if one
views the pattern of point estimates as an increase in the post-2012 period—
which itself is arguably unclear from this Figure—that increase would have
started to materialize in 2011.
Altogether, these results are simply not supportive of the dominant
theory that weaker constitutional protections against pretextual stops
intensify racial bias in traffic stops. This conclusion is not altered when we
consider the possibility of a lagged response and incorporate a longer postArreola reform window, as we demonstrate in Figures A14 and A15 of the
Online Appendix. In the case of the non-white-to-white differential, we do
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observe further increases in this differential in 2016 and 2017, but again, this
longer dynamic picture continues to suggest that we may simply be
observing a trend that predated Arreola.134
F. Seattle Police Department Data Analysis
We now address one final empirical concern. We have conducted this
analysis thus far using data from the Washington State Patrol. However, one
may be concerned that we investigated the impact of a change in the law
bearing on pretextual stops in a setting in which one might have predicted a
weaker impact in the first place. After all, even in the pre-Arreola period
during which pretextual stops were prohibited in Washington, it would
perhaps be hard to challenge the decision of a state trooper since much of
their job entails regulating traffic. Perhaps the change in the law would be
expected to more meaningfully change the outcome in cases involving other
types of officers—i.e., officers perhaps primarily focused on nontraffic
offenses. In the Online Appendix, we address this question by turning to
traffic-stop data from the Seattle Police Department (SPD).135 Though these
data are limited in certain respects relative to the state trooper data, our
analyses of the SPD data are consistent with that set forth above, further
reinforcing our conclusion that Arreola did not appear to increase racial
disparities in traffic-stop rates.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. The Exclusionary Rule
Our empirical analysis can be seen in one of two lights. One can
arguably view our analysis as demonstrating that the 2012 substantive
change in Washington constitutional law had little to no impact on racial
disparities in traffic-stop rates. At the very least—being mindful of the
inherent empirical challenges facing this exercise that may leave us slightly
less inclined to speak so definitively—one can view our analysis as finding
no evidence to support the claim that the Arreola decision increased racial

134 Taking those five post-Arreola years together in the non-white-to-white differential graph, it
appears that the slope of the post-Arreola trend in this stop-rate differential is no greater than the
corresponding slope in the pre-Arreola period. If anything, the post-Arreola slope is less than in the
preperiod. In the Black–white stop-rate Figure, we continue to see an increase in the point estimates in
2016 and 2017, though the differential in 2017 relative to the reference period still remains statistically
indistguishable from zero, and the largest jump that we observe in this differential occurs in the year prior
to Arreola. This raises doubts that this trend in the point estimates may be reflective of an effect of Arreola
itself.
135 See Online Appendix at 1571–73.
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disparities in stops and thus no evidence to support the claim that Whren may
contribute to racial disparities in stops.
In Part II, we theorized that Arreola’s lack of effect on officer behavior
might be due to certain inherent limitations in the enforcement of substantive
constitutional standards, including (1) the difficulty in applying the Ladson
prohibition against pretextual stops given the difficulty in establishing
pretext and (2) the small likelihood that an officer’s decision to initiate a stop
will be impacted by the remote possibility that any evidence found during a
pretextual stop will be suppressed, especially when the officer may have
motivations beyond investigating crimes—e.g., hitting stop quotas. From
this perspective, one can view our empirical analysis and the null effects that
we present as providing support for the theory that the exclusionary rule is
ineffective in shaping officer behavior in the context of traffic stops.
Of course, it would be inappropriate to draw broader conclusions about
the exclusionary rule in other contexts. For instance, the exclusionary rule is
probably important in shaping a homicide detective’s behavior when she is
deciding whether to enter a suspect’s house. But where some combination of
the above two factors—low likelihood of punishment and noninvestigative
purpose—is present, we should be at least skeptical that the exclusionary rule
will effectively encourage Fourth Amendment compliance.
B. Reducing Racial Bias in Traffic Stops
Our results are helpful for policymakers and others interested in
reducing racial bias in traffic stops. Most obviously, our results caution that
strategies focused on implementing a Fourth Amendment right—or state
constitutional equivalent—against pretextual stops might not be as impactful
as many assume. The same goes for a statutory equivalent that provides an
exclusionary remedy as the sole deterrent measure.
It might be worth exploring the combination of a tailored test for
impermissible motive with a more effective deterrent than the exclusionary
rule. Our theory for why a Fourth Amendment-type solution would fail to
provide a reliable and implementable test for pretext was predicated on two
types of concerns—both of which might be avoided through
extraconstitutional policy changes. First, judges might be unreliable in
applying any test against the police in the context of a suppression hearing.
Second, a test for pretext will be difficult to apply with confidence to an
individual stop.136 These problems might be avoided by punishing officers
based on their aggregate performance, not individual stops, and having the
system implemented by police departments or other agencies, not courts.
136
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Perhaps precincts could track and analyze their officers’ stops. Even though
it is difficult to tell whether a given stop was made for good or bad reasons,
longer term trends of racially disparate stops can be a red flag that triggers
certain disciplinary responses.
There are, however, significant challenges even with a system like this.
Skeptics will point to the “benchmarking” problem.137 If the underlying rates
of traffic violations are different across races, we should expect stops to be
disproportionate. As a result, it is difficult to know that an officer is doing
something wrong simply because her stops are not proportionate across
race.138 We suggest several possible approaches to this challenge.
First, while this benchmarking problem may present a real challenge
when looking at aggregate counts of stops, it may be more feasible to detect
an officer’s inappropriate, disproportionate treatment of drivers by race by
focusing more specifically on certain characteristics of stops. For instance,
one can look at the distribution of officers’ stops of Black drivers across the
different speed-violation ranges—e.g., 0–5 miles per hour (mph) over the
speed limit, 5–10 mph over the limit, etc. If one finds that this distribution is
heavily concentrated in the low-violation ranges, at least relative to officers’
corresponding distribution for white drivers, this would cast doubt on claims
that the greater overall volume of stops for Black drivers is due to their
elevated driving speeds. If that were true, one would at least expect that these
violation-speed distributions would be roughly similar across driver races.
So, if the higher relative volume of Black stops is concentrated on minor
offenses, this pattern is suggestive of both pretext and bias by officers.
Relatedly, if for a given reason and type of stop—e.g., driving 5–10
mph over the limit—an officer searches Black drivers at a higher rate than
white drivers, this will naturally raise red flags regarding racial bias by the
officer. Further, an officer’s “hit rate” across races—the proportion of
searches that actually turn up contraband139—can be helpful in figuring out
whether an officer’s behavior is acceptable. These latter metrics may be less
indicative of pretext but are certainly suggestive of bias.
What types of remedies should be considered when these metrics raise
red flags of bias or pretext? More effective remedies—i.e., more effective
than the exclusionary rule—might include taking away scheduled pay raises

137 Grogger & Ridgeway, supra note 125, at 878 (discussing that the “key problem” when testing for
racial disparities in traffic stops is the “benchmarking problem,” referring to the challenge in identify a
“risk set” of behaviors against which to compare “the racial distribution of traffic stops” that occur).
138 Id.
139 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 21, at 725–26.
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or promotions for officers who have trended towards racially biased stops.140
Pay and promotion are likely to be more important to a given officer than the
admissibility of evidence at some future trial. But it is also important that
any solution ensures that superior officers are encouraged to actually follow
through—higher-ups should be rewarded rather than punished for
sanctioning subordinates. 141 Independent oversight may also be helpful in
this regard.142 And it is important that the punishment is regularly and evenly
applied with evident procedural fairness. Otherwise, the sanction might
backfire and actually increase noncompliance.143
Ultimately, even though these solutions might have a better chance at
success in reshaping officer behavior than a federal or state constitutional
rule change, they face significant obstacles because they still operate in a
world in which officers have tremendous discretion about whether or not to
make a given stop. Once we accept that officers can stop some people who
commit a given traffic offense and not stop others who commit that same
offense, it will be incredibly difficult to police and punish bad stops after the
fact. Thus, it is possible that the most fruitful avenue for reducing racial bias
in traffic stops is to simply ex ante reduce officer discretion in making traffic
stops.
For example, as technology advances, traffic laws could be enforced
remotely and automatically—obviating any human discretion about whom
to stop.144 And even without affirmative government adoption of technology,
as self-driving cars are adopted, we might expect traffic violations to largely
disappear.145 In that case, the scope for police discretion would be reduced
because officers might be expected to stop every driver they see committing
a traffic violation. One could also imagine low-tech changes with the
potential to reduce officer discretion. Perhaps we could ex ante require
officers to only stop every fifteenth driver they notice commit a low-level
140 See Christopher J. Harris & Robert E. Worden, The Effect of Sanctions on Police Misconduct,
60 CRIME & DELINQ. 1258, 1280–81 (2014).
141 See id. at 1260 (“[S]upervisors are reluctant to file complaints against subordinates, understanding
that doing so puts their subordinates’ future chances of promotion at risk and likely reflects poorly on the
supervisor.” (citation omitted)).
142 For a discussion of pros and cons of civilian review boards, see Udi Ofer, Getting It Right:
Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2016).
143 See Harris & Worden, supra note 140, at 1280–81.
144 Elizabeth E. Joh, Discretionless Policing: Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 95 CALIF. L.
REV. 199, 221 (2007).
145 See Jordan Blair Woods, Autonomous Vehicles and Police De-Escalation, 114 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 74, 77 (2019); Martine Powers, Could Self-Driving Cars Be One Solution to Police Shootings
During Traffic Stops?, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/
wp/2016/07/12/could-self-driving-cars-be-one-solution-to-police-shootings-during-traffic-stops/ [https:
//perma.cc/R8DA-FPVD].
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traffic violation. Of course, such a solution would still require significant
trust in the police. But it might be a step in the right direction.
We should note, this is not an endorsement of any of these solutions.
Our primary goal in this Article has been to assess the conventional wisdom
that Fourth Amendment-like standards have a meaningful bearing on officer
behavior. Having cast doubt on that prediction, we simply seek to offer
certain alternative approaches that do not suffer from the setbacks of
standards enforced via the exclusionary rule. Ultimately, approaches like
those suggested should be the subject of future inquiry and research.
CONCLUSION
A dominant view among scholars of the Fourth Amendment is that a
permissive stance towards pretextual traffic stops contributes to greater
disparities in the rates of traffic stops across race. We suggest, however, that
there may be conceptual grounds to doubt this conventional view and stress
the weaknesses in the deterrent channel linking the substantive constitutional
law and the officer decision-making process. Ultimately, whether or not the
imposition of a Fourth Amendment-like prohibition against pretextual stops
will reduce the racial disparities observed in such stops is an empirical
question. Drawing on a natural experiment based on a change in the
constitutional treatment of pretextual stops in the State of Washington and
employing a range of empirical techniques, we fail to find evidence in
support of the conventional wisdom. To the extent that policymakers wish to
address the undeniable problem of racial bias in the rates of traffic stops, our
evidence cautions against placing all of our hopes in a constitutional-rightsbased approach. This is not to say that such rights are unimportant. They
simply are not enough to attack this critical issue. We propose that
policymakers consider certain extraconstitutional approaches, including
those better designed to bolster a deterrent channel or those that attempt to
remove officer discretion from traffic regulation altogether.
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